Jutland:Preliminaries

German Plans

On 25 April 1916, whilst returning from the Second Raid on Yarmouth, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, Commander-in-Chief of the German High Sea Fleet, learnt that U-boats were to conduct commerce warfare in line with prize law regulations until further notice. This decision was made after the USA threatened to cut off diplomatic relations with Germany following the sinking of the SS Sussex with the loss of 50 civilian lives, some of them American. This severely reduced the effectiveness of U-boats against merchant ships, Scheer decided that it would be better to employ his long range U-boats in co-operation with his surface fleet against enemy warships.

A raid by battlecruisers on Sunderland in the north east of England, supported by battleships. was planned for 17 May but had to be postponed for six days because some of the battleships developed condenser problems. It was expected that Admiral Sir John Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet would respond, so U-boats were positioned to ambush them.

Ten U-boats were to patrol the North Sea from 17 to 22 May. On 23 May two would position themselves off the Pentland Firth, on the Grand Fleet's route from its base at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands into the North Sea. Eight would be off the Firth of Forth to intercept Vice Admiral Sir [[David Beatty, First EarlBeatty|David Beatty}} Battle Cruiser Fleet as it left Rosyth. Another U-boat would force her way into the Firth of Forth, close to Rosyth, one would reconnoitre Sunderland and two would watch the Humber. A neutral merchantman had told the Germans, wrongly, that a large British force, including battleships, was located there. Three more boats would lay mines in the Firth of Forth, the Moray Firth and west of the Orkneys.

The operation had to be postponed because repairs to the battlecruiser S.M.S. Seydlitz, damaged by a mine in the Second Raid on Yarmouth, took longer than expected. Technical problems with two U-boats meant that there were only eight off the Firth of Forth and the plan to send another into the Firth had to be abandoned. A coded message was sent to the U-boats on 30 May, two days before they were due to return home, informing them that the High Sea Fleet was about to put to sea.

The initial plan to attack Sunderland was abandoned on 30 May because high winds made airship reconnaissance, which Scheer needed to guard his northern flank, impossible. It was replaced by a sweep in the Skagerrak, the water between southern Norway and northern Denmark, apparently aimed at the British cruisers and merchant ships that were frequently seen there. Cruisers and torpedo boats could guard the exposed flank since the High Sea Fleet would not be going so far from its bases.

30 May

At 14:20 Iron Duke received a signal from the Admiralty:

Urgent 431. There are indications that German fleet are to be in outer roads by 7 p.m. to-night and may go to sea early tomorrow. Object may be to have them ready to support returning Zeppelins. Sixteen German submarines are now at sea, most of which are believed to be in the North Sea, two are off Terschelling.

In 1920, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Jackson, recalled:

Our wireless direction-finding stations, under Captain Round, kept careful and very intelligent watch on the positions of German ships using wireless, and on 30th May, 1916, heard an unusual amount of wireless signals from one of the enemy ships which they located at Wilhelmshaven. This was reported to me; the time was a critical and anxious one in the war and I had also some reasons for expecting that the German Fleet might put out to sea during the week. Our Fleet was ready at short notice and had arranged, unless otherwise prevented, to put to sea on the following day for a sweep of the North Sea. But if the German Fleet got to sea first, the chance of a meeting in waters not unfavourable to us was remote; our object was to try to get to sea before or shortly after the Germans, and hitherto we had not succeeded in doing so. Later on in the afternoon, it was reported to me that the German ship conducting the wireless had changed her position a few miles to the northward. Evidently she and her consorts had left the basin at Wilhelmshaven and had taken up a position in the Jade River ready to put to sea. This moment decided me to send our Grand Fleet to sea, and move towards the German Bight at once and try to meet the German Fleet and bring it to action.

Bibliography

• Naval Staff, Admiralty (1926). The Battle of Jutland (The German Official Account). O.U. 5359. The National Archives. ADM 186/626.
• Campbell, N. J. M. (1986). "Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting." London: Conway Maritime Press.
• Gordon, Andrew (2005). The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command. London: John Murray (Publishers). ISBN 0719561310. (on Amazon.com and Amazon.co.uk).
• Hines, Commander Jason, U.S.N. (October 2008). "Sins of Omission and Commission: A Reassessment of the Role of Intelligence in the Battle of Jutland". The Journal of Military History 72 (4): pp. 1117-1153.
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• Tarrant, V. E. (1995) "Jutland: The German Perspective." London: Arms and Armour Press.