Jutland:Conclusions

From The Dreadnought Project
Jump to: navigation, search
Battle of Jutland
31 May – 1 June, 1916
Chapters
PreliminariesRun to the SouthRun to the NorthClash of the Battle FleetsNight ActionsBritish ReactionsGerman ReactionsAnalysisConclusions

Evaluation in the Press

The New York Herald summed up on 4 June:

It is an accepted maxim of war that success belongs to him who holds the contested field and exerts continuing pressure on the retreated enemy. The Germans, having shot their bolt, and recognizing their inferiority to the Grand Fleet, felt discretion to be the better part of valour. The success of day and night, tactically and morally measured, rests with the British.

Evaluation in Print

Arthur Marder wrote in 1978 that tactically, "since neither fleet was able to inflict a crippling blow on the other, the battle belongs to the series of inconclusive battles or partial victories which are the rule in naval warfare."[1] V. E. Tarrant appreciated this conclusion so much that he repeated it word for word in his account of the battle.[2] Tactical expert Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. holds that, "Tactically he [Jellicoe] executed what he conceived to be his mission: to bottle up the High Seas Fleet, make his numbers count, win as he could, and avoid loss due to carelessness, enemy wit, or bad luck."[3]

German historian Michael Epkenhans refers in passing to "a great victory against the Grand Fleet" (which he dates to 1 June).[4]

Footnote

  1. Marder. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow. III. p. 252.
  2. Tarrant. Jutland: The German Perspective. p. 278.
  3. Hughes. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. p. 86.
  4. Epkenhans. p. 68.

Bibliography