Second L.C.S. (Royal Navy) at the Battle of Jutland

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The Second Light Cruiser Squadron operated in a screening role for the Battle Cruiser Fleet at the Battle of Jutland.

Under the command of Commodore William Edmund Goodenough in Southampton, the squadron was notably more attentive to its role in keeping the fleet commander informed as to enemy movements and dispositions, often by wireless. Goodenough's report on the action was sent on 12 June, 1916, and included his own report for Southampton with enclosures from the captains of the other three light cruisers in his formation.[1]

The Squadron was represented by four light cruisers at the battle.[2]

Southampton

Commodore William Edmund Goodenough's own report for his flagship was dated 2 June, 1916 and was soon followed by a short note dated 5 June.[3]

SIR,
I HAVE the honour to submit the following report of the
proceedings of the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, consisting of
HM. Ships " Southampton " (wearing my Broad Pendant),
" Nottingham " (Captain Charles B. Miller), " Birmingham "
(Captain Arthur A. M. Duff), and " Dublin " (Captain Albert
C. Scott) during the operations on 31st May and 1st June :—
31st May.
2. The enemy were reported by the Senior Officer, 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron, between 2.23 and 2.56 p.m.
3. A t 4.40 p.m. " Southampton " sighted and reported
enemy's battle fleet bearing S. by E., steering N. The Second
Light Cruiser Squadron closed to within 13,000 yards to observe
enemy's battle fleet, and came under very heavy fire.
At 5.00 p.m. the Second Light Cruiser Squadron turned
Northwards and followed our battle cruisers and 5th battle
squadron. The Second Light Cruiser Squadron were at this
time practically in line with the rear ship of the 5th battle
squadron, and came under a very heavy fire from time to time
until about 6.05 p.m. ; no damage, however, resulted.
4. At 6.15 p.m. our battle fleet was sighted right ahead.
5. At 6.35 p.m. " Warspite " suddenly turned South and
ran in towards the German line, coming under heavy concentrated
fire.
" Warspite " shortly afterwards rejoined the line at
the rear. During this time the Second Light Cruiser Squadron
occupied position " N " (in accordance with Grand Fleet Battle
Orders, page 41).
6. At about 6.40 p.m. the action appeared to become general.
7. At 6.47 p.m. the Second Light Cruiser Squadron turned
in towards the German line partly to finish off a disabled
battleship, but more to observe the enemy's rear more clearly,
their course being in doubt. Enemy's turn to E.S.E. was
reported by " Southampton" at 7.04 p.m.
The Squadron now came under heavy fire from the German
battle fleet, and it became necessary to return to the rear of
our battle line.
Between 6.55 and 7.05 p.m. water and spray was constantly
coming on board " Southampton " from enemy's salvoes,
which were dropping all round the ship.
8. At 7.30 p.m. the Germans altered course together to
S. by W., and their destroyers made an effective smoke screen,
as the German fleet was now in bad light.
9. At about 8.30 p.m. a German destroyer was sighted and
fired on by " Southampton " and " Dublin," who hit her heavily
amidships. She was afterwards sunk by a division of our
destroyers.
10. At 9.00 p.m. the enemy's destroyers attempted to attack
our 5th battle squadron from the North-West. They were
driven off by the Second Light Cruiser Squadron ; one destroyer
was observed to have been hit.
11. At 10.20 p.m. the Squadron was engaged with five enemy
ships, apparently a cruiser and four light cruisers, who concen-
trated on " Southampton " and " Dublin " at very short range.
The action was very sharp while it lasted (about 15 minutes), and
the casualties in " Southampton " were heavy. Detailed lists
of killed and wounded in " Southampton " and " Dublin " have
been forwarded separately.[4]
Three fires broke out on board " Southampton " during the
action; these were promptly extinguished, though the hoses
had been very much cut up by shell fire.
12. On the enemy retiring, " Southampton," " Nottingham,"
and " Birmingham " proceeded and remained astern and on
starboard quarter of the centre of the battle fleet during the
night, as it was not known what protection they had against
destroyer attack. Firing astern was heard at intervals between
10.30 p.m. and 2.00 a.m.
H.M.S. " Dublin " became detached from the Squadron
during the night, and did not rejoin till 10.00 a.m. the next day.
1st June.
13. Squadron, except "Dublin," regained touch with our
Battle Cruiser Fleet at 4.30 a.m., and proceeded as ordered.
" Southampton " passed a mine, with horns, at 4.25 a.m.
in Latitude 55' 25' N., Longitude 6' 11' E.
14. The behaviour of all ranks and ratings of" Southampton"
while the ship was in the trying position of receiving a heavy
fire from 11 and 12-in. guns without being able to return it,
and also during the night action with fires breaking out on board
was in every way in accordance with the best and highest
traditions of the Service.


Details on recommendation, personnel &c. omitted from the Report
as reproduced in the
Official Despatches.


15. A track chart[5]
enclosed (Enclosure 2).

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
W. E. GOODENOUGH,
Commodore.

Second Light Cruiser Squadron

The Vice-Admiral Commanding,
Battle Cruiser Fleet,


SIR,
IN continuation of my letter No. 037/5 of 2nd June, I have
the honour to report that from a piece of shell found on board
" Southampton " it appears that one of the cruisers engaged
with the Second Light Cruiser Squadron at 10.20 p.m. on
31st May was armed with 9.4-in. guns, probably the " Roon "
or " Fürst Bismarck."
The course of the enemy squadron was S.S.E., and position
at 10.20 p.m. Latitude 56° 10' N., Longitude 6° 11' E. When
beaten off, they appeared to retire to the westward.
One torpedo (high speed setting) was fired at close range by
" Southampton " at 10.21 p.m. It is worth observing that
when passing within about a mile of the spot, by reckoning,
at 11.30 a.m. the next day, the sea was covered by oil, for an
area of about a square mile.


Details on recommendation, personnel &c. omitted from the Report
as reproduced in the
Official Despatches.


I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
W. E. GOODENOUGH,
Commodore.

Second Light Cruiser Squadron

The Vice-Admiral Commanding,
Battle Cruiser Fleet,

Birmingham

Captain Arthur Allan Morison Duff's report to Goodenough was dated 2 June.[6]

SIR,
I HAVE the honour to report that during the operations on
31st May 1916 and 1st June 1916 I was in the immediate presence
of your broad pendant except for a few hours during the night
31st May 1916-1st June 1916, and I therefore only mention a
few points that may be of interest together with an account of
my proceedings during the time I was separated from you.
2. About 4.35 p.m. G.M.T. on Wednesday, 31st May 1916,
H.M.S. " Birmingham " was under heavy fire from 11-in. or
12-in. guns of the enemy's battle fleet, and on one or two other
occasions later in the evening.
On all these occasions the shells were falling all round the
ship so close that a good many pieces of the shells as they burst
catne on board and also a good deal of water thrown up by them.
The fact that the ship was not actually hit appeared extra-
ordinary, and I attribute it in a great measure to the fact that
on each occasion when fire was opened the ship at once steered
away at full speed, and on each salvo falling near the ship, course
was at once altered 2 points one way or another. As a result
of this, although the next salvo appeared correct for range it
was generally well clear to the right or left,. But there was
also a large element of good fortune in it, as when there was
more than one ship firing at us it was impossible to avoid them
all and many fell all round the ship.
It was noticed that just before they ceased firing on account
of the ship getting out of range, the time of flight was 40 seconds,
which appeared also to be the time between the salvoes.
3. About 7.0 p.m. G.M.T. on 31st May 1916 fire was opened
on a disabled battleship or large cruiser with the remainder of
the squadron, and the shooting appeared to be good, the bursts
of the shell on her being quite obvious.
4. I was unable to fire on the destroyer that the rest of the
squadron fired at later in the evening owing to being blanketed
by some of our own destroyers.
5. During the attack on the enemy's cruisers about 10.15 p.m.
G.M.T. it was impossible, owing to the smoke made by the
three ships that were ahead of me in the line, to see anything
until the enemy's ships switched on their searchlights when fire
was opened on the rear ship. From the same cause it was then
so difficult to see that I could not distinguish what class of
ships they were. The enemy ship returned the fire and the
shot fell very close round the ship.
6. After the squadron turned to the Eastward together
I found myself approaching our 5th Battle Squadron, who were
steering to the Southward, and was obliged to turn to the north-
ward to avoid the two rear ships, thus losing touch with the
remainder of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. As I could not
see any destroyers or light cruisers guarding the 5th Battle
Squadron from enemy destroyer attack in that direction,
I remained during the dark hours on the starboard quarter of
the rear ship from where I could act in the event of an attack
on them. At daylight I sighted " Southampton " and " Notting-
ham " on my starboard bow and rejoined.
7. At about 11.30 p.m. G.M.T. on 31st May 1916 I observed
two or more large enemy ships switch on their searchlights and
open fire on some of our destroyers or light cruiser and destroyers,
astern. At the time I was convinced from their appearance
and the speed they were going that they were the enemy battle
cruisers, but I have since ascertained that they were probably
battleships.
8. Soon after midnight 31st May-1st June 19161 observed
heavy firing some distance away to the North-eastward.
9. When under fire of the battle fleet the engines were put
to full speed and subsequently kept at it for two hours in order
to regain station. During this period the revolutions averaged
381, or 14 higher than the ship has done since she was in commis-
sion. The work of the engine-room department under Engineer
Commander John B. Hewitt was most satisfactory throughout
a very arduous day.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
A. DUFF,
Captain.

The Commodore Commanding,

Second Light Cruiser Squadron,
H.M.S. " Southampton."

Nottingham

Captain Charles B. Miller's report to Goodenough was dated 2 June.[7]

SIR,
I HAVE the honour to report the proceedings of H.M. Ship
under my command, during the Action on 31st May 1916.
2. At 2.56 p.m. a signal was received from Senior Officer,
Battle Cruiser Fleet, to 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron : "Prepare
to attack the van of the enemy."
3. " Nottingham " was at that time on " Lion's " starboard
bow and took up a position a shade on her port bow as far ahead
as possible, in order to break up any attack from Enemy
Torpedo Craft, and to support our own Torpedo Boat Destroyers
of 13th Flotilla.
4. The enemy Torpedo Boat Destroyers started to attack
about 4.0 p.m., and " Nottingham " opened fire upon them,
which fire appeared to be effective, and the attack was not
pressed home.
5. As " Lion " was gradually opening the range, " Notting-
ham " altered to starboard to prevent getting in her way, and
when " Nottingham " could no longer support the T.B.D.'s,
she took station on Commodore 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
which station she maintained during rile remainder ot the action.
6. About 4.40 p.m., "Nottingham " tired an E.R. Torpedo
at Enemy Battle Fleet ; the range being about 16,500 yards,
the Battle Fleet being in line ahead. No other opportunity for
firing torpedoes presented itself.
7. The ship was steaming at high speed from 3.0 p.m. until
8.0 p.m., and from 4.0 p.m. to 6.0 p.m. the engines were running
at a mean speed of 377 revolutions, the greatest S.H.P. developed
being 28,156.
8. No defects were brought to fight except an increased
leakage of oil fuel from after tanks into reserve feed tanks in
After Engine Room, caused probably by the vibration.
9. I would submit that this performance is most creditable
to the whole of the Engine Room Stag especially in that
Engineer Commander Gerald Moore, R.N., was able to receive
no assistance from the Senior Engineer Lieutenant, he and
14 Engine Room Ratings (including seven chief or P.O.'s) being
out of the ship at the time.
10. I enclose a tracing showing the rough track of " Notting-
ham " between 3.0 p.m and 10.30 p.m.[8] This track was plotted
a trained rating track working in the Lower Conning Tower.
11. " Nottingham " sustained no damage and no direct hits
from heavy shell, although she was frequently straddled and
fragmentsplotted of heavy shell bursting in the water close to the ship
struck the sides and fell about the upper deck.
12. The behaviour of both Officers and Ship's Company was
everything that could be desired.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
CHARLES B. MILLER,
Captain.

The Commodore Commanding,

Second Light Cruiser Squadron
H.M.S. " Southampton."

Dublin

Captain Albert Charles Scott's report to Goodenough was dated 2 June.[9]

SIR,
{{JODSig|

See Also

Footnotes

  1. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp.175-184.
  2. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp. 33, 46.
  3. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp.175-178.
  4. These lists were not printed in the Official Despatches.
  5. This chart was apparently lost at the Admiralty.
  6. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp. 178-180.
  7. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp. 183-184.
  8. See Plate 14.
  9. Battle of Jutland Official Despatches. pp. 180-183.

Bibliography