Difference between revisions of "David Richard Beatty, First Earl Beatty"

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Admiral of the Fleet THE RIGHT HONOURABLE David Richard Beatty, First Earl Beatty, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O., P.C., Royal Navy (17 January, 1871 – 11 March, 1936) was an officer of the Royal Navy.

Early Life & Career

Beatty was born David Richard Beatty on 17 January, 1871 at Howbeck Lodge, Stapeley, in the Registration District of Nantwich, in the County of Chester. His birth was registered on 17 February.^[1] He was the second of four sons of Captain David Longfield Beatty (1841–1904), of the Fourth Hussars, and his first wife, Catherine Edith (d. 1896), daughter of Nicholas Sadlier of Dunboyne Castle, County Meath, Ireland. David Richard and his elder brother Charles were both born out of wedlock, as David Longfield Beatty and Catherine Sadlier were not married until nearly six months after David Richard was born.^[2]

David's brothers all served in the army, and his one sister, Kathleen, known as Trot, married Colonel Miles Courage, of the brewing family, who became master of the Hampshire hunt. David inherited his family's love of hunting, horsemanship, and all country sports, but as a young boy showed such interest in ships and the sea that his parents had him prepared for the navy. In January 1884, at thirteen, the normal age for officer entry, he passed into the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, tenth out of ninety-nine candidates. He passed out in January 1886, eighteenth of his term of thirty-three. He was not amenable to the punitive discipline and rigid routine of Britannia, the training ship, and so was never chosen as a cadet captain. He described himself as ‘essentially Irish’, and perhaps his high spirits and generally attractive personality were seen as redeeming features. On the other hand he had ‘interest’, that established factor in furthering a successful naval career. His mother, relying on their shared Irishness, personally appealed to Admiral Lord Charles Beresford and had his original appointment to the China station changed to one on Alexandra, the flagship of the Mediterranean Fleet, where the commander-in-chief, Queen Victoria's second son, the duke of Edinburgh, gained a sound professional reputation.

Such a ship attracted an unusual number of officers who subsequently achieved high rank, among them Colin Keppel and Stanley Colville, who could provide valuable role models for the cadets and midshipmen. Beatty's companions in the gun room included Walter Cowan, Richard Phillimore, and Reginald Tyrwhitt, who later served under him as flag officers in the North Sea. Others of his seniors became influential in court circles during the reigns of Queen Victoria's successors. In the meantime his manners, cheerfulness, and good looks made him popular with the royal and other highly placed visitors to the flagship, while his skills as a horseman gained him additional friends and admirers. Alexandra was typical of the capital ships of the day: fully rigged for sail, but equipped for steam propulsion and strongly armoured, it mounted heavy, muzzle loading guns and carried Whitehead torpedoes.

Beatty was rated midshipman on 15 May 1886, was promoted sub-lieutenant on 14 May 1890, and began scientific and technical courses at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, and specialist establishments in Portsmouth in September. In contrast to these he had three periods of sea service under sail in the corvette Ruby. The last of these followed his promotion to lieutenant on 25 August 1892; he had not been attracted by the six months' accelerated advancement gained by high performance in the courses and achieved a first-class pass only in torpedoes.

More directly relevant to the newer navy was Beatty's appointment to the battleship Camperdown in October 1893, when he entered the world of steam tactics. In 1895 he joined the battleship Trafalgar, whose executive officer Stanley Colville had formed a high opinion of his potential during their time in Alexandra. This led to promotion and distinction, which enabled Beatty to out-distance his contemporaries for the rest of his career.

A fellow officer in Trafalgar, Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Fremantle, later recalled of Beatty:

We had some enjoyable shooting trips together. He was a conscientious officer who never failed in his duties and obligations, but showed little interest in the Service outside his immediate functions, and when our ship was at Malta distinguished himself as a member of the naval polo team.^[3]

When Colville was appointed to command the gunboats supporting General Sir Herbert Kitchener's Sudan expedition of 1896 he selected his protégé to command one of his craft.

Beatty did not disappoint him. When Colville was wounded by shore fire, he assumed command of the whole flotilla in its hazardous passage through the cataracts of the Nile, showing exemplary initiative, leadership, and courage under fire. On 22 September 1896 the British forces reached Dongola, and Kitchener halted his advance. At Kitchener's personal request he rejoined for the 1897 completion of the campaign.

The new flotilla under the command of Colin Keppel, another former Alexandra man, also performed well. Beatty's exploits gained him wider recognition, including the DSO, while Kitchener in his dispatch of 1898 substantially contributed to his special promotion to commander on 15 November. Aged twenty-seven, and with only six years' service as lieutenant rather than the normal eleven or twelve, he was now well ahead of his contemporaries on the ladder of promotion. He had shown exceptional boldness and also became known to Winston Churchill, another participant in the Sudan expedition.

Beatty was appointed executive officer of the battleship Barfleur, flagship of the second in command of the China station, in April 1899. Her captain, Stanley Colville, had again asked for him. Initially he concentrated on the internal working of the ship to ensure the smartness in appearance and drills on which a commander's promotion traditionally depended. But wider events gave him opportunity for more exciting activity and professional advancement. China was in the grip of an uprising by the Boxer nationalist movement, which was opposed to external influence and threatened foreign nationals in Beijing. In subsequent land operations around Tientsin (Tianjin), Beatty played a prominent part, but he was seriously wounded in his left arm. Also wounded was Captain John Jellicoe, Admiral Seymour's flag captain. For his service in China he was promoted to the rank of Captain on 9 November, 1900.^[4]

Captain

On home leave in 1899 Beatty met his future wife, Ethel (d. 1932), daughter of Marshall Field, the Chicago millionaire and chain-store proprietor. They met in the hunting field, where her hard, almost reckless, riding gave them common ground. A strong mutual attraction developed. On his return from China with an enhanced reputation, her interest increased, and he remained entranced by her complex personality. He was well aware of the advantages of her great wealth, but she was a married woman, although separated from her American husband, Arthur M. Tree. Beatty's career could have suffered as a result of an illicit relationship, and they had to assume complete discretion in their conduct and correspondence. However, Tree obtained a divorce in America on the grounds of his wife's desertion, and despite objections from both families they married at Hanover Square register office in London on 22 May 1901, only ten days after Ethel's divorce was publicized.

Beatty's appointment as captain of the cruiser Juno (launched 1895, 5600 tons) on 2 June 1902 inaugurated a critical period in his career. His qualities of leadership were well established, but his ability to master the problems arising from changing propulsion, weaponry, and communications systems had yet to be tested. The Mediterranean Fleet, in which he was to serve, had been trained by Sir John (Jacky) Fisher, its commander-in-chief from 1899 to 1902, to a high pitch of readiness for war, based on speedy manoeuvring and offensive action. Captains and admirals were tested in regular fleet manoeuvres in which the advent of wireless telegraphy introduced new complications. Beatty's command of Juno began with a short attachment to the Channel Fleet under the command of Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, renowned for his skills in the tactical handling of fleets and squadrons and for the heavy demands he made on his subordinates. In his letters to his wife Beatty admitted to losing his temper with his own officers, who did not match up to the standards he required in the highly competitive rivalry between ships to meet his admiral's requirements. He also reacted more positively, not only by entertaining his officers in the traditional way but also by trying to lead them into discussions designed to bring out the lessons to be learned from exercises and manoeuvres. Also, and very characteristically, in his letters to his wife he strongly criticized his superiors for not following suit. He was particularly critical of his last commander-in-chief, Lord Charles Beresford, for imposing too much detailed control over his subordinates, while skilful in avoiding involvement in Beresford's quarrel with Fisher, which was splitting the higher ranks of the navy. He became increasingly critical of the repetitive nature of fleet exercises, and especially of the favourite one of blockading the ‘enemy’ fleet in its own harbour without recognizing that the development of effective torpedoes had made this a risky operation. That his overall performance satisfied his superiors was demonstrated when he was given command of the new cruiser Suffolk (9800 tons) on 25 October 1904 for his last eleven months in the Mediterranean.

Long periods of separation had always been resented by naval wives, and Ethel was no exception. She became jealous of David's deep involvement in his professional and social life in Malta, and he, in turn, became critical of the frivolity of her life in London society and of the carping tone of her letters. Their relationship was never easy, but it never lacked vitality and affection. Eventually she joined him in Malta, where they lived in great style; on 22 February 1905 she gave birth to their first son, David Field (later second Earl Beatty). Their second son, Peter, was born on 2 April 1910.

Beatty was succeeded in command of Suffolk by Captain Rosslyn E. Wemyss. According to Lady Wester Wemyss, Sir John Fisher had laughingly described Suffolk as "the worst ship in the navy,"^[5] and upon taking command Wemyss had supposedly "found the ship plunged in the deepest gloom, the officers discontented, the men unwilling."^[6]

The couple returned to England towards the end of 1905, and after a period on half pay Beatty became naval adviser to the Army Council on 21 December 1906. He was involved in planning the movement of the expeditionary force to France. Owing to Fisher's refusal to disclose his war plans, joint operations were not formally discussed with the military.

At a gathering of the Home Fleet at Cromarty in 1909, Beatty complained to his wife, "Many admirals, and not one that inspires a great deal of confidence, this is private, unless it be Prince Louis, and his national or birth qualifications are against him."^[7]

Beatty had reached the top of the Captains' list without the necessary six years' of peacetime service, and an Order-in-Council was promulgated on 2 December, 1909 sanctioning Beatty's promotion to Flag rank, the regulations notwithstanding.^[8] He was promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral on 1 January, 1910, vice Charles Henry Cross, promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral.^[9] He attended the June, 1911 War Course, where he placed fifth out of seven Rear-Admirals. He was judged to be "Well set, an excellent example to the juniors. Smart and able, apt to be rash in conclusion".^[10] On 19 June, 1911 he was appointed a Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath (C.B.) on the occasion of the coronation of King George V.^[11] He was not employed until January 1912, largely owing to his refusing the Admiralty's offer of an appointment as second in command of the Atlantic Fleet instead of the Home Fleet, which he preferred, judging it to be most important in a future German war. In view of his comparative youth for flag rank, this was perceived as arrogance; along with his wealth, this provoked criticism and jealousy.

Beatty was rescued from this impasse by Winston Churchill's becoming First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911. Advised by Fisher to exercise particular care in his choice of naval secretary, Churchill selected Beatty after an interview in which he demonstrated "the profound sagacity of his comments expressed in language free from technical jargon" (R. Churchill, 550). According to Admiral Sir Dudley de Chair, when Beatty met Churchill the latter said, "You seem very young to be an admiral." To which Beatty replied, "And you seem very young to be First Lord of the Admiralty."^[12]

In the absence of an organized naval staff, an able and determined naval secretary could exercise considerable influence over his political master. Beatty used the opportunity to the full, and despite his earlier suspicion began to appreciate Churchill's genuine enthusiasm for the navy and his ability in cabinet to further its interests. A paper that he addressed to Churchill in April 1912 on naval dispositions in a German war shows the maturity and perceptiveness of Beatty's contributions to their discussions (Beatty Papers, 1.36–45).

The practical result of Churchill's approbation led to Beatty's taking temporary command of the Sixth Cruiser Squadron, with his flag in Aboukir for the fleet manoeuvres of July 1912. His success in bringing his command to fighting efficiency must have reminded his critics of his high leadership qualities.

As always, difficulties in his marriage accentuated the problems of Beatty's naval career. Ethel seemed to take his successes for granted and did not offer the constant emotional support he expected. Her wealth opened the doors of London society and great country houses, but her divorced status prevented formal presentation at court and led to unrealistic arguments about his seeking another profession.

Ethel was determined to maintain her standard of living, and in July, 1905 she had negotiated with her father a permanent financial settlement on which—as she triumphantly told her husband—they could live happily without getting into debt or needing to worry any more about money matters (Beatty Papers, 1.15–16). They certainly spent lavishly, with outgoings on houses bought or rented in London and the country, Ethel's extravagant holidays on the continent, horses, gambling, and eventually a steam yacht, Sheelah, which seemed to offer relief from her frenetic restlessness.

The battlecruiser squadron, 1913–1916

Beatty's appointment to the battlecruiser squadron did arouse some doubts. He was fourteen years younger than his predecessor and without fleet command experience, but he had the backing of Fisher, Churchill, and influential sections of the press. His temperament seemed ideally matched with the unique speed and hitting power of the force designed to locate the German fleet and prevent it from evading the stronger Grand Fleet.

In the months following his appointment Beatty defined the squadron's role: it should be the essential element in scouting sweeps through enemy waters in a strength that could be countered only by equivalent capital ships, and thus precipitating the desired fleet action. As the contact developed it would directly support the Grand Fleet by defending its scouting forces and then forming the leading division of the whole line of battle. For such complex tasks the battlecruisers' crews had to display specific qualities of leadership, discipline, and fighting spirit. Captains had to be ready to take the initiative and not wait for detailed orders from Beatty when the circumstances of battle limited his knowledge of a rapidly changing situation, as long as they acted in accordance with his central aim, the annihilation of the enemy. He expected his officers to train their crews accordingly. Throughout the war Beatty consciously designed his visits to ships to inspire his men with his own offensive spirit and his confidence in victory.

At the beginning of war Beatty was confident of the readiness of his command and of the competence of his new commander-in-chief, Jellicoe, and of the Admiralty's ability to exercise overall control. The first months of hostilities soon made him realize that the navy's aim of early victory through a decisive fleet action would be far more difficult to achieve than he and the nation at large had foreseen. The enemy's realistic decision not to risk such an action, together with his own increasing awareness of the inhibition cast by mines and torpedoes on freedom of strategic and tactical mobility, along with the vagaries of weather and visibility in the North Sea, combined to obstruct the fleet's hopes. The Admiralty soon found it difficult to assess enemy intentions correctly and to convey clear information to the fleet, with a consequent growth of distrust among the sea commanders. Beatty faced the prospect of a future characterized by fruitless searches for an elusive enemy, each one followed by a return to base, the exhausting labour of coaling, and a wait for the next alarm, all leading to an increase in frustration throughout the squadron.

The action in the Heligoland Bight on 28 August 1914 was a positive relief. It established Beatty's force's readiness for combat and his own capacity to take responsibility in risking offensive action. His sweep into enemy waters in support of light forces resulted in the destruction of three enemy light cruisers and one destroyer; this was set against one British light cruiser seriously damaged and correspondingly fewer human casualties. Beatty's decision to withdraw his whole force without encountering enemy capital ships demonstrated his grasp of strategic priorities. But investigations after the event revealed omens for the future, prominent among them a weakness in reporting enemy movements, and inaccurate gunnery owing to the battlecruisers' speed and frequent changes of course. The most significant result of the battle was Beatty's disgust at the Admiralty's failure to co-ordinate the elements it had added to his command. This loss of trust in the Admiralty's competence was reinforced by the defeat of Admiral Christopher Craddock at Coronel, and, directly related to Beatty's own responsibilities, the enemy battlecruisers' success in evading interception after mining and bombardment raids on England's north-east coast in November and December 1914. The latter provided opportunity for fleet action, as the high seas fleet sailed in support of the battlecruisers. The Admiralty's intelligence organization directed the battlecruisers' movements, and Beatty—supported by a battleship squadron—was directed towards a good position for interception. But the sailing of the enemy battle fleet was not detected, and Jellicoe did not realize the urgency of approaching the combat area. Beatty's force never engaged his rival Franz von Hipper, largely because of repeated failures in reporting by his scouting cruisers—a situation made worse by Beatty and his signals staff, who caused the cruisers to lose contact with the enemy in the appalling weather which dominated the whole action. In turn, the German fleet commander, von Ingenohl, missed the opportunity to destroy Beatty's battlecruisers with his overwhelming force. On learning of the desultory encounter with light cruisers he decided that the Grand Fleet was approaching and returned to base.

Dogger Bank, 23 January, 1915

After the failure to intercept the raid of December 1914 the Admiralty reshaped the Grand Fleet's organization and command structure. The battlecruiser base was moved from Cromarty to Rosyth. Jellicoe remained in overall fleet command, but on the first report of German fleet activity the Admiralty would take control of Beatty's squadron and the submarine, cruiser, and destroyer forces at Harwich and order them to an appropriate rendezvous. Once Jellicoe was at sea and in communication, he would assume operational control of the whole fleet. The battlecruisers were at sea on Christmas day 1914 in support of a seaplane raid against Cuxhaven and again on 18–19 January 1915 in support of a sweep by Commodore Tyrwhitt's Harwich force. No battlecruiser contacts were made, and the German commander-in-chief became confident that further sweeps could be repulsed by battlecruisers without support from the high seas fleet. The Admiralty, warned by the activity of Hipper's battlecruisers on 23 January, planned to cut them off from their base. Beatty was ordered to rendezvous with Tyrwhitt 30 miles off Dogger Bank. A battleship squadron and an armoured cruiser were ordered to positions 40 miles north-west to prevent any German breakaway, and the Grand Fleet was to move south from Scapa to confront any move by the high seas fleet. This plan succeeded when contact was made at 8 a.m. on 24 January, and Beatty, with superior force, stood between Hipper and his base. Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand, and Indomitable should have overwhelmed Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger, and the armoured cruiser Blucher. Hipper turned for home as soon as he identified his enemy's battlecruisers, and Beatty followed in pursuit. Blucher and Seydlitz (the flagship) were both severely damaged, but events then turned against Beatty. His fire distribution orders were misinterpreted; Moltke, being free from attack by a British battlecruiser, concentrated its fire on Lion, which was hit repeatedly. Her speed was reduced, and at 10.50 a.m. she lost all electrical power, leaving only flag signals for communicating Beatty's orders. Princess Royal, Tiger, and New Zealand overhauled Lion, but their close pursuit was delayed by Beatty's ordering a change of course; he claimed that he had seen an enemy submarine, but the claim was never confirmed. Rear-Admiral Archibald Moore in New Zealand, wrongly influenced by an ambiguous signal from Beatty, concentrated his fire to sink the crippled Blucher, thus allowing the battlecruisers to escape. When Beatty transferred to Princess Royal and resumed command he decided that it was too late to steam further into German waters and at 12.54 p.m. turned for home.

Modern research has stressed the poor performance of the British battlecruisers' gunnery; aside from the original shooting against Blucher, they achieved only six hits but received twenty in return. The bad shooting was due to smoke and the absence of effective director control (or range-finding apparatus) from all but Tiger, whose equipment failed during the action. Beatty's signalling difficulties ultimately led him to have the traditional signal ‘engage the enemy more closely’ reintroduced, and although he reluctantly admitted that the incompetence of his flag lieutenant had been partly responsible for his communication failures, he did not replace him.

The failure to crush his enemy counterparts was Beatty's responsibility. The Admiralty's plan was sound, the weather was neutral, and it was inevitable that after the event his inquiries and actions should be thorough. His most important practical conclusion was that the most favourable range for future engagements was 12,000–14,000 yards. Hitting could be effective at this distance; and it would be outside the reach of enemy secondary armament and surface-launched torpedoes. He was satisfied by the battlecruisers' ability to maintain their top speed, their chief defence against enemy attack, especially as their armour protection was inadequate against German armour-piercing shells. In any future battle, main and secondary armament firing should be as heavy as possible, and supplemented by cruiser and destroyer gunnery and torpedo attacks in a concentrated offensive, which itself was the best form of defence.

Beatty placed the responsibility for failure mainly on Rear-Admiral Archibald Moore, commanding the 2nd battlecruiser squadron in New Zealand, for not showing attacking initiative when his superior had to give up command, and on Captain Henry Pelly of Tiger for concentrating his fire on Blucher instead of Moltke. Both had failed to grasp that the objective was ‘the complete destruction of the enemy … My signals and Standing Orders are intended for guidance as I have often stated, and not for rigid obedience if they tend to hinder the destruction of the enemy’ (Beatty Papers, 1.247).

In a revision of his standing orders on 18 February 1915 Beatty developed his thought on the battlecruisers' role when working in close support of the battle fleet. They should avoid obstructing the vision or manoeuvring freedom of the heavier ships, and ‘they should not come within range of enemy Dreadnoughts until our own Battle Fleet is engaged’ (Beatty Papers, 1.254). They should then open fire immediately.

After Dogger Bank, Beatty's frustration increased with his inability to achieve a fleet action and with the navy's failure to find a solution to the enemy's submarine campaign. Moreover his relations with Jellicoe became increasingly delicate, although he continued to hold him in genuine respect and agreed with him on major strategic issues, particularly in thinking that the Grand Fleet's prime task was the negation of its German rival and that no risks must be taken with its precarious superiority. Beatty particularly feared the enemy's increasing strength in torpedo craft, submarines, and the unique reconnaissance capability of Zeppelins; he thought that Jellicoe was not strong enough in his complaints to the Admiralty on these and other shortcomings. He admitted that the whole naval situation left him strained in temper and prone to minor ailments.

The Dogger Bank failure did not break Churchill's or Fisher's confidence in Beatty. In February 1915 Beatty's command was retitled the Battle-Cruiser Fleet and divided into three squadrons, each of three battlecruisers, with Lion as fleet flagship in addition. They were to be supported by three light cruiser squadrons, totalling thirteen ships and sixteen modern destroyers, all based at Rosyth. Beatty still agreed with Jellicoe that Scapa was the safer base for the Grand Fleet. What he did press for was greater community of thought with the Admiralty and for opportunities for discussion. His meeting with Jellicoe on 3 February 1916 was the first for five months, and he followed it up with increasing pressures on his commander-in-chief by passing on to him recommendations by two of his squadron commanders, Osmond de Brock and William Pakenham, that the Battle-Cruiser Fleet should be strengthened to balance the new more powerful vessels that were about to join the enemy fleet.

Beatty embodied these views in his own submission to the Admiralty, suggesting that the appropriate answer was to add the fast 5th battleship squadron to his force at Rosyth. Jellicoe argued that the battleships lacked the speed that Beatty claimed, but perhaps his main fear was that Beatty, so strengthened, would be tempted to fight a prolonged action with the high seas fleet rather than concentrate on his primary duty to lead it towards the superior Grand Fleet. This suspicion was probably unjustified, but it reflected the growing gulf between the two men and Jellicoe's resentment at his subordinate's direct correspondence with the Admiralty.

Alongside his professional burdens, Beatty's marriage brought additional strains. Ethel had persuaded the Admiralty to take up her yacht Sheelah as a hospital ship. Her genuine interest in the ship gave her grounds to rent Aberdour House, which was near enough to Rosyth for her husband to pay brief visits when the naval situation permitted. These were marked by mutual lack of sympathy and understanding.

On 9 August, 1915, Beatty was confirmed in the rank of Vice-Admiral.^[13]

Jutland

Beatty's command on 31 May 1916 included six battlecruisers, with Lion as flagship; the 5th battle squadron of four fast ships under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas in Barham; twelve light cruisers; twenty-seven destroyers, plus three light cruisers as flotilla leaders; and the seaplane carrier Engadine. The battleships were there as a temporary replacement for three Invincible class battlecruisers detached to Scapa Flow for gunnery practice.

The battle of Jutland originated in a plan by the new German fleet commander, Rheinhard Scheer, to cut off Beatty's force without engaging the Grand Fleet. The Admiralty were alerted by enemy radio activity on 30 May and ordered Jellicoe and Beatty to sea. The benefits of this early warning were reduced by a lack of co-operation between the uniformed naval staff and the largely ‘amateur’ analysts of Room 40 in naval intelligence. Jellicoe was given an overestimate of German battleship strength and, more importantly, was told that it was still in port after it had sailed. This resulted in his moving south slowly and in Beatty's being unaware, when he intercepted the enemy, that he was soon to face not only the five battlecruisers but also the main German battle fleet. His confidence in the naval staff was permanently undermined.

When Beatty's battlecruisers opened fire at 3.48 p.m. on 31 May he failed to co-ordinate his attack with Evan-Thomas's battleships, which did not engage until twenty minutes later. He was totally unaware of the presence of the high seas fleet, but soon realized the destructive power of the German battlecruisers' gunnery; Lion was hit on her midship's turret. Worse was to come when Indefatigable and Queen Mary exploded before his eyes, with the loss of 1283 officers and men. This was the occasion of Beatty's often quoted remark to Chatfield, ‘There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today’ (Roskill, 160). His battleships were now in effective action; he ordered a destroyer attack against what he saw as a fleeing enemy, and seemed on the point of achieving his decisive victory despite his heavy losses. But the arrival of the high seas fleet reversed the situation, and he turned to lead the enemy into the jaws of Jellicoe's Grand Fleet, which unknown to the Germans was approaching the battle area. Beatty was later criticized for the inadequacy of his reporting of the situation, which caused Jellicoe to signal to him twice, ‘Where is the enemy's Battle Fleet?’ (ibid., 169), and for having to make his fundamental decision on deploying his own fleet to block the enemy retreat to its home ports without knowing its exact location and course. At 6.07 p.m. Beatty took up his allotted position ahead of the Grand Fleet. From then on he had to conform to the fleet's movements. But at 7.47 p.m., apprehensive that Jellicoe's pursuit was lagging, he signalled to him, ‘Submit that van of battleships follows battle-cruisers. We can then cut off the whole of the enemy's battle fleet’ (ibid., 177). Surprisingly, in view of his distaste for any independent movement by divisions of his fleet, Jellicoe agreed. However, Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, commanding the leading division, claimed that he was unable to gain close contact with the battlecruisers, much to Beatty's suspicion and anger. This was an opportunity missed. Beatty did sight and engage the already seriously damaged Seydlitz and Derfflinger and a squadron of old battleships which, with Jerram's support, could well have been overcome. Beatty played no distinctive part in the confused night action, which ended in Sheer's escape. On 2 June he returned to Rosyth to join the gloom and controversy that followed.

Beatty's early correspondence with Jellicoe was free from rancour and full of sorrow for the heavy losses of ships and men, as well as frustration at the enemy's escape. He did share, however, in the fleet's general anger with the Admiralty's unduly alarmist releases to the press. He also reacted angrily at an Admiralty meeting with Jellicoe when the first sea lord, Sir Henry Jackson, criticized his failure to keep the 5th battle squadron in line with Jellicoe at the opening of the action. Beatty responded that if his earlier request for the battleships to be put under his command had been approved, Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas and his ships would have absorbed the battlecruisers' combat procedures, and the delay in coming into action would never have occurred. This was a warning of future disputes, as was his wife's contribution to London gossip on Jellicoe's conduct of the battle. Despite its losses, the Grand Fleet was ready for action almost immediately, in numbers superior to those of a high seas fleet so seriously damaged in the battle that it never sought fleet action until October 1918 when, in desperation at Germany's plunge into defeat, the high command ordered it to do so and its crews mutinied.

Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, 1916–1919

When Jellicoe was appointed first sea lord in November 1916 to revitalize the anti-submarine campaign, there was no realistic alternative to Beatty to succeed to the command of the Grand Fleet. He hoisted his flag on board Iron duke on 28 November, having been promoted acting admiral on the previous day. Some doubted his ability to handle and administer so huge a force; it had twenty-four battleships, three battlecruisers, nineteen cruisers, and fifty destroyers under direct command at Scapa Flow, in addition to the battlecruiser force at Rosyth now under his friend William Pakenham. The Grand Fleet itself comprised some 35,000 officers and men afloat, including three vice-admirals and six rear-admirals.

Beatty had prepared himself for this gigantic responsibility under the shadow of Jutland, determined that the failures of that day should not be repeated. The technical problems he left to his senior subordinates and his personal staff, but for tactical and strategic doctrine and above all for leadership he drew on his own resources. First was his confidence that victory could be gained, and second was his ability to convey this confidence to his subordinates, from flag officers to stokers. He cultivated decisiveness of speech, eccentricities of uniform, and as much personal contact as possible. ‘The first thing that strikes you about him are his penetrating eyes. He has a phenomenally quick brain and he can take in all he wants to know in one glance … and decisions are given without a moment's hesitation’ (Roskill, 148).

Beatty's experience since 1914 had increased his awareness of the uncertainties of sea warfare and hardened his insistence that decisive victory could come only from commitment to the offensive and to personal initiative at all levels of command. His display of self-confidence won over the most critical of his senior subordinates, sustained the loyalty of his personal staff, and maintained the fighting spirit of his men throughout the years of frustration that lay ahead. Hence his Nelsonic reputation. His grasp of strategic realities and the need to avoid unnecessary risks has been less clearly appreciated. Despite his hopes for a second Jutland, he accepted that a superior Grand Fleet, vigilant and informed by an efficient Admiralty intelligence system, would provide the essential basis of both a devastating economic blockade and the eventual defeat of the enemy's submarine campaign. He would not agree to any weakening of the fleet to deal with the unlikely danger of invasion. Sufficient deterrence could be provided by the light and submarine forces at Harwich, supported by a squadron of older battleships in the Thames estuary. Connected with this was his conviction, shared with the Admiralty and Jellicoe, of the dangers of any section of the fleet being deployed for battle in the southern North Sea; there German strength in submarines and mines and her Zeppelin reconnaissance might enable her to weaken his force so that it could no longer discharge its fundamental strategic roles.

Although his analysis of grand strategy was realistic, Beatty's hopes always focused on the achievements of the decisive battle which would compensate for the shortcoming of Jutland. His ‘Grand fleet battle instructions’, promulgated in 1916–18 (Beatty Papers, 1.456–506), replaced Jellicoe's ‘Battle orders’ and embodied his basic demands on his subordinates. They should always concentrate on annihilating the enemy without waiting for detailed orders. To achieve this they should attack with every available means: guns, underwater weapons, and aircraft. The last were to be used both in reconnaissance and in attack with bombs, torpedoes, and machine-guns. A retreating enemy must be hotly pursued by day and night. To avoid torpedo attack, ships should turn towards the enemy rather than away (as had happened at Jutland). The spirit of these instructions was instilled in all ranks by training and exercises. Beatty produced a visible demonstration of this commitment when in February 1917 he transferred his flag from Iron duke to Queen Elizabeth, which had a design speed of 25 instead of 21 knots. Even more significant were the removal of the Grand Fleet's base from Scapa Flow to the Firth of Forth in July 1917 and Beatty's pressure on the Admiralty to authorize aircraft-carrier strikes on the enemy fleet in harbour.

Events showed that even an imaginative combat doctrine and greater fighting resources could not overcome the uncertainties of sea warfare or individual failures of judgement. In October and December 1917 two lightly defended Scandinavian merchant convoys sustained heavy losses, and on 17 November an unsuccessful sweep by Pakenham's battlecruisers had missed an opportunity to inflict heavy losses.

The likelihood of Beatty's second Jutland receded, and 23 April 1918 was the last time on which he took his entire fleet to sea. In the following months the morale of the high seas fleet, already shaken by protests against poor conditions and harsh repression in August 1917, was hastened by signs of the breakdown of the imperial government and general social discontent caused by the economic blockade. Although Hipper, now commander-in-chief, repeated his readiness to seek action, his ability to do so declined, and with it Beatty's opportunity for battle.

This drawn-out disappointment at failure to secure his objective added to Beatty's exasperation with what he saw as the Admiralty's failure to counter the dangers to the alliance's war effort from the submarine campaign against merchant shipping. Although long aware of the threat of submerged weapons, he had never expected the type of unrestricted operations implemented by Germany in 1917. He never fully appreciated the technical and scientific difficulties of submarine detection and destruction, and denounced the Admiralty for not organizing offensive hunting operations. He was prevented from extreme denunciation of the lack of success only by the apprehension that he might be ordered to the Admiralty to give this leadership himself. He afterwards claimed to be an early advocate of the convoy system, which proved to be a solution to the problems, but he supported it only after deciding that all else had failed. And later he actually released some of his Grand Fleet destroyers for merchant convoy duties.

Perhaps Beatty's most important contribution was to use a meeting with Lloyd George to tackle the Admiralty on its opposition to convoy. In addition, however, he used his position as the allies' leading naval commander to intervene in political and diplomatic issues. He approached these with supreme self-confidence in correspondence and personal interviews with ministers, other influential politicians, and the king.

After the United States entered the war in April 1917 she put six battleships under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman at Beatty's disposal. A close professional accord developed between the two, and Beatty was soon reporting that the new ally was enthusiastically accepting his tactical doctrine and command style. But he never allowed himself to be overawed by America's wealth and power. He remained sceptical of her great technical contribution, the North Sea mine barrage. He also persuaded the minister for blockade, Robert Cecil, to modify his strong pressures on Norway, which he thought incompatible with the allies' claim to fight for the freedom of small nations.

Beatty's most significant political impact was made on the armistice of 1918. He insisted that the German fleet should surrender unconditionally to the Royal Navy, while the entire U-boat force should also be handed over. He personally staged the arrival in the Firth of Forth of the German fleet on 21 November so that they moved as prisoners between the lines of the Grand Fleet to receive his unauthorized signal: ‘The German flag will be hauled down at sunset today, Thursday, and will not be hoisted again without permission’ (Roskill, 279). The symbolism of the surrender was completed on 24 November when the enemy ships moved out of the Firth of Forth to be interned at Scapa Flow, escorted by the 1st battlecruiser squadron, his former command.

Two of Beatty's political objectives were not achieved. First, despite his arguments before the war cabinet, his case for depriving Germany of Heligoland was not pursued. Second, his claim that in the final peace terms the bulk of Germany's most modern capital ships should be allotted to Britain, rather than to her allies, foundered on 21 June 1919 when the ships were scuttled by their crews at Scapa Flow. By then Beatty, having been promoted admiral of the fleet (the youngest ever) on 3 April, had hauled down his flag on 7 April, avoiding responsibility for this ironic achievement of his victory over the high seas fleet.

The period from the immediate aftermath of Jutland to the end of the war was the most testing time of Beatty's career. It also coincided with occasional meetings with his wife that were full of mutual misunderstanding. However, he wrote to her almost daily: sometimes apologizing for his fits of bad temper; more often taking her into his confidence over his professional difficulties and his uninhibited criticisms of his naval and political colleagues. He was to find consolation in his increasingly close relationship with Eugénie Godfrey-Faussett, the wife of Captain Bryan Godfrey-Faussett, an equerry and friend of George V. She was a beautiful woman well known in London society for her wit and gaiety. Beatty at first reacted cautiously to her letters of admiration for the hero of Jutland, but soon responded with increasing warmth. Public scandal had to be avoided, but they probably became lovers during his visit to London in April 1917 and met again during her visits to Scotland. When he became first sea lord more opportunities arose, but the need to maintain secrecy and Beatty's continuing loyalty to Ethel, as her mental instability became more apparent, meant that the relationship with Eugénie was never free from strain.

First Sea Lord, 1919–1927

On 18 October, 1919, Beatty was granted an Earldom of the United Kingdom, with the courtesy titles Baron Beatty of the North Sea, and of Brooksby in the County of Leicester, and Viscount Borodale of Wexford in the County of Wexford.^[14]

Beatty's Service

Footnotes

Bibliography

Papers

Service Record