Difference between revisions of "114th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence"
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| − | | The total number of German divisions which could be considered as mobile and able to take and keep the field has been estimated at 121. These would probably be distributed as follows:—<br> | + | | The total number of German divisions which could be considered as mobile and able to take and keep the field has been estimated at 121. These would probably be distributed as follows:—<br>                Divisions.<br> French frontier         84<br> Russian frontier        27<br> Sea coast           10<br>     Total         121<br>In present circumstances, he thought that 84 divisions the limit of a German Army invading France. |
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| <small>Strength of the German Army.</small> | | <small>Strength of the German Army.</small> | ||
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| <small>Strength of the German main attack.</small> | | <small>Strength of the German main attack.</small> | ||
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| + | | Against this force the French could probably place from 37 to 39 divisions. So that it was quite likely that our six divisions might prove to be the deciding factor. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | <small>Strength of the French active defence.<br>Effect of the intervention of the British Army.</small> | ||
| + | |-valign="top" | ||
| + | | MR. M<small>C</small>KENNA enquired how it was possible for the French and British forces to oppose a greater number of divisions to the Germans in view of the limitations of 3 divisions to a road. | ||
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| + | | | ||
| + | |-valign="top" | ||
| + | | GENERAL WILSON said that it was owing to the French having their own railways to supply them. Railways would not available to the Germans in the earlier stages. | ||
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| + | | | ||
| + | |-valign="top" | ||
| + | | MR. CHURCHILL asked whether the Germans might not extend their right further into Belgium. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | <small>Extension of the German right to the left bank of the River Meuse.</small> | ||
| + | |-valign="bottom" | ||
| + | | GENERAL WILSON said that to do this the Germans must either infringe the neutrality of Holland or take Liege. This fortress was strong, but normally its garrison was very weak—700 to 1,000 men—which was quite inadequate to defend it. It was possible, therefore, that the Germans might take it by a ''coup de main''. But they could not hope to capture Huy or Namur or Antwerp in the same way. That portion of their force advancing along the left bank, that is north, of the Meuse would accordingly have to guard its right against the fortress of Antwerp, and if it had entered Belgium through Dutch territory without having captured Liege, it would have to mask that fortress, while in its further advance it would be separated from it main body by the fort of Huy, the fortress of Namur and by the River Meuse. This would be dangerous. Moreover, although the Belgians would possibly be content to protest against the violation of their southern provinces, they would almost certainly fight if the Germans were to invade northern Belgium as well. The Belgian field army would number 80,000 men.<br>On the whole front the broad result was that, although the Germans could deploy 84 divisions against the French 66 and the garrisons of their frontier fortresses, the Germans could not concentrate their superior force against any one point. Our 6 divisions would therefore be a material factor in the decision. Their material value, however, was far less than their moral value, which was perhaps as great as an addition of more than double their number of French troops to the French Army would be. This view was shared by the French General Staff. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | <small>Value of the intervention of the British Army.</small> | ||
| + | |-valign="top" | ||
| + | | SIR EDWARD GREY agreed that our military support would be of great moral value to the French.<br>As to the Belgians, he thought that they would avoid committing themselves as long as possible in order to try and make certain of being on the winning side. | ||
| + | |-valign="top" | ||
| + | | MR. CHURCHILL enquired what force the Germans could bring up between Lille and Maubeuge by the fifteenth day, if they wished to do so. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | <small>German advance through Northern Belgium.</small> | ||
| + | |-valign="top" | ||
| + | | GENERAL WILSON said that six through roads crossed the frontier between Lille and Maubeuge, but it was impossible to say without detailed examination of such a problem, in which so many indeterminate factors existed, what strength the Germans might attain to, and by date they could this line. If the Germans were to extend their front to the north in this manner the French would be able to bring up ten divisions from the south, perhaps more. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | |-valign="top" | ||
| + | | MR. CHURCHILL asked whether the Germans had not sufficient force to attack each gap and to march through Northern Belgium as well. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | |-valign="bottom" | ||
| + | | GENERAL WILSON said that that was so, but their difficulty was that the march through Northern Belgium was a dangerous operation, and would require so many men to mask the Belgian Army and the Belgian fortresses that if the figures were carefully examined, it would be found that in present circumstances no advantage and a good deal of risk would accure to the Germans by taking this course. In ten years' time they would have so many men that they certainly would be able to press their attack all along the line and march through Northern Belgium as well with additional divisions in reserve at rail head. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | <small>Future increase in strength of the German Army.</small> | ||
|} | |} | ||
Revision as of 14:16, 6 August 2022
The 114th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence took place on 23 August, 1911.[1] The meeting was apparently proposed by Haldane at dinner with Asquith, Grey, McKenna and Churchill on 14 August. Excluded from the meeting were Lewis Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies; the Marquess of Crewe, Leader of the House of Lords and Secretary of State for India; and Viscount Morley, Lord President of the Council. The meeting was, according to Harcourt, "arranged some time ago for a date when it was supposed that we should all be out of London!"[2]
Minutes
Present:
The Right Hon. H. H. ASQUITH, M.P., Prime Minister (in the chair).
The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. SIR EDWARD GREY, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department.
The Right Hon. REGINALD MCKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
Admiral of the Fleet SIR ARTHUR WILSON, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., V.C., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALDANE, Secretary of State for War.
Field-Marshal SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON, G.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
Brigadier-General H. H. WILSON, C.B., D.S.O., Director of Military Operations.
General SIR JOHN FRENCH, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., Inspector-General of the Forces.
- Rear-Admiral SIR CHARLES OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., Secretary.
Major-General SIR A. J. MURRAY, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., Director of Military Training, also attended.
| THE PRIME MINISTER said he had called the Committee together as the European situation was not altogether clear, and it was possible that it might become necessary for the question of giving armed support to the French to be considered. | ||
| The Sub-Committee which examined this question in 1908 came to the following conclusions:— | Report of Sub-Committee on "Military needs of the Empire (C.I.D. Paper 109-B). | |
| "(a) The Committee, in the first place, desire to observe that, in the event of an attack on France by Germany, the expediency of sending a military forceabroad or of relying on naval means alone is a matter of policy which can only be determined when the occasion arises by the Government of the day. | The question of policy. | |
| "(b) In view, however, of the possibility of a decision by the Cabinet to use military force, the Committee have examined the plans of the General Staff, and are of opinion that, in the initial stages of a war between France and Germany, in which the Government decided to assist France, the plan to which preference is given by the General Staff is a valuable one, and the general Staff should accordingly work out all the necessary details. | Instructions to the General Staff. | |
| The General Staff had prepared a fresh Memorandum on the subject in the light of recent developments (C.I.D. Paper 130-B), and on the second hypothesis that the United Kingdom becomes the active ally of France, the important points were those contained on p. 2, namely, that we should mobilise and dispatch the whole of our available regular army of six divisions and a cavalry division immediately upon the outbreak of war, mobilising upon the same day as the French and Germans. It was further suggested that additional reinforcements, consisting of two or three divisions of British and native troops might be drawn from India, and possibly the seventh division from the Mediterranean and South Africa. | Re-examination of the question by the General Staff. Proposals of the General Staff. | |
| Lastly, the General Staff asked from the Admiralty an assurance that the Expeditionary Force could be safely transported across the Channel and from the other directions indicated in their paper, and that the Navy will protect the United Kingdom from organised invasion from the sea. As regards these last two points, Admiralty Memorandum (C.I.D. Paper 131-B) did not give a categorical reply. |
Assurances asked from the Admiralty by the General Staff. | |
| SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the reply of the Admiralty to the first question was that the Navy could spare no men, no officers, and no ships to assist the Army. The whole force at the disposal of the Admiralty would be absorbed in keeping the enemy within the North Sea. Ordinarily the Navy would furnish transport officers and protecting ships. These could not be furnished in these circumstances. The Channel would, however, be covered by the main operations, and provided the French protected the transports within their own harbours, the Admiralty could give the required guarantee as too the safety of the expedition. | Inability of the Navy to assist. Safety of the expedition guaranteed. | |
| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that as regards that point the General Staff asked for no more. He presumed that the General Staff could count upon the ungrudging support of the Transport Department of the Admiralty. | ||
| MR. MCKENNA said that assistance could not be given during the first week of war. The whole efforts of the Admiralty weould be absorbed in mobilising the Navy, and the Transport Department especially would be fully occupied in taking up Fleet Auxiliaries. | Transport Department of the Admiralty unable to assist during the first week of war. | |
| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that the whole scheme had been worked out in detail. He also pointed out that in the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese Navy had handed over the whole business of sea transport over to the military authorities, who carried out the work without difficulty. | ||
| MR. MCKENNA said that the difficulty lay in the question of time. | ||
| ADMIRAL BETHELL said that the demands of the army could not be attended to if they were simultaneous with the mobilisation of the Fleet. | ||
| MR. MCKENNA said that he heard of this scheme now for the first time. | The General Staff proposals not previously communicated to the First Lord. | |
| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that in accordance with the conclusion arrived at by the Sub-Committee, as set out in paragraph 20 (b) of their report dated the 24th July, 1909 (C.I.D. Paper 109-B) the General Staff had worked out the details of the scheme with the Departments of the Admiralty concerned. The Director of Naval Intelligence had laid down that to ensure the safety of the transports their courses must be west of a line drawn from Dungeness to Cape Griz Nez. The sea transport of the force had been worked out with the Director of Transports in detail day by day. Such a scheme necessarily implied war. | The plans worked out in detail by the General Staff with the Naval Intelligence and Naval Transport Departments in accordance with the instructions of the C.I.D. | |
| GENERAL WILSON asked if that opinion held good even if every detail had been worked out beforehand. | ||
| ADMIRAL BETHELL said that he had not been able to see Admiral Groome, the Director of Transport [sic], but he understood from his Department that they had assumed that the Fleet had already been mobilised. | ||
| SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the scheme had not been brought to his notice. He had understood that a scheme for dispatching the Expeditionary Force had been mooted, but that it had been abandoned. | The First Sea Lord unaware of the scheme. | |
| MR. MCKENNA said that there was no question as to the safety of the transports, the sole difficulty was the question of time and the simultaneous demand upon the Transport Department of the Admiralty to meet naval and military requirements. | The question one of time, not of safety. | |
| THE PRIME MINISTER said that the plans of the General Staff as laid before the Sub-Committee of 1908 had always laid stress on the necessity for mobilisation and concentration taking place immediately upon the outbreak of war, if military intervention was to be valuable, and he was at a loss to understand why it should be supposed that the Fleet should not be mobilising at the same time. | Time always an essential feature of the General Staff proposals. | |
| MR. MCKENNA said that the Admiralty had actually recorded in a C.I.D. Paper their inability to guarantee the transport of troops upon the outbreak of war. | Formal record by the Admiralty of their inability to transport troops on the outbreak of war. | |
| THE PRIME MINISTER read the paragraph referred to in C.I.D. Paper 116-B as follows:— (1). The general principle which has for many years governed the question of reinforcements is that the movement of troops by sea in the early days of a maritime war is an operation attended with serious risk, and the Admiralty cannot guarantee to protect the transports so employed. This did not appear to him to have reference to the present case in which the question was one of ferrying troops over narrow waters to a friendly country, and he was surprised that the Admiralty were not prepared to guarantee the safety of the transports. |
The principle inapplicable to the present case. | |
| MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether we could not count also upon the co-operation of the French Fleet. | Co-operation of the French Fleet. | |
| MR. MCKENNA said that almost the entire French Fleet was in the Mediterranean. | ||
| MR. CHURCHILL enquired whether there was not some risk of German war vessels outside the North Sea interfering with the transports, if all our ships were employed in shutting the Germans in and none were left to patrol the Channel. | ||
| SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the risk was very slight. Up to the fifth or sixth day after the declaration of war we should have ships traversing the Channel on the way to their stations. This would give some local protection in addition to that afforded by the main operation. | Risk of hostile interference with the expedition very slight. | |
| LORD HALDANE said that the real point seemed to be the question of transports. Could the Admiralty carry out the scheme as worked out or not. | ||
| GENERAL WILSON said that the dates fixed for embarkation to begin were from the second day of mobilization up to the twelfth day. He certainly imagined that the Director of Transport understood. | ||
| MR. MCKENNA said that the First Sea Lord would examine into the questions raised. He regretted that there should have been any misunderstanding. | Admiralty to examine the question. | |
| THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was necessary that it should be understood that the question of time was all important. The simultaneous mobilisation of our army and that of the French, and the immediate concentration of our army in the theatre of war were essential features of the scheme. The second assurance asked for by the General Staff, that of a guarantee by the Admiralty against invasion might be postponed for the moment, and he would first ask the Committee to consider the desirability of carrying out the operations proposed by the General Staff or the alternative scheme suggested by the Admiralty on their merits. |
The question time all-important. | |
| |
||
| GENERAL WILSON said that our Expeditionary Force consisted of— 1 Cavalry Division; 6 Divisions; Army Troops; a total of about 160,000 men. |
Strength of the British Army. | |
| Continuing, he referred to a large-scale map and stated that for the purposes of war Luxembourg might be regarded as German and that there was no reason to suppose that Germany would not hesitate to march through Southern Belgium. | Disregard of the neutrality and Belgium and Luxembourg. | |
| The Franco-German frontier might therefore be taken as extending from Altkirch to Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) on the one side and from Belfort to Maubeuge on the other. A distance in each case of about 230 miles. The former places could be taken as indicating the line upon which the Germans must detrain their troops and from which they must march. | Line of the German deployment. | |
| On the French side this 230 miles of frontier was closed by lines of fortresses and connecting works. The southern line extending from the fortress of Belfort, which commanded the country up to the Swiss frontier, to Epinal. From Epinal there was an unfortified gap of 30 miles to Toul, and from Toul a second fortified line stretched north for 60 miles to Verdun, beyond which 90 miles of open frontier extended to Maubeuge. The fortresses named were modern and strongly fortified. Beyond Maubeuge and there was the fortress of Lille, also strong. La Fère and Laon were being dismantled and Rheims was half-open. Paris itself was very strongly fortified. In the south Langres, Dijon and Besançon were all strong, modern fortresses. The garrisons of the frontier defences amounted to about 250,000 men, the garrison of Paris to 250,000, and other garrisons brought the total to about 600,000 men. Rheims was only weakly garrisoned. The 30-mile gap between Epinal and Toul contained only four roads running through difficult country, and this gap was defended by a French Army based upon Langres. None of the French fortresses could be taken otherwise than by siege operations. The connecting works ("forts d'arrêts") might possibly be taken by assault. The German fortresses, with the exception of Metz, were situated on the Rhine. Metz had been very strongly fortified in recent years and was now second only to Paris in Strength. |
||
| The total number of German divisions which could be considered as mobile and able to take and keep the field has been estimated at 121. These would probably be distributed as follows:— Divisions. French frontier 84 Russian frontier 27 Sea coast 10 Total 121 In present circumstances, he thought that 84 divisions the limit of a German Army invading France. |
Strength of the German Army. | |
| Against this force the French could put 75 divisions, less 9 required to watch the Italian frontier, or a net total of 66 divisions. To these must be added, say, 200,000 fortress troops, who could take a share in the defence of the line of the Meuse. | Strength of the French Army. | |
| SIR EDWARD GREY said that he did not think that the French would have anything to fear from Italy. | Influence of Italy. | |
| GENERAL WILSON said that however that might be, there was no doubt that in the first deployment, the French would employ nine division to watch the Italian frontier. The French fortified lines were probably safe against attack, and, as he had already indicated, the gap between Epinal and Toul did not form a favourable line of advance. The German would, of course, attack all along the line, but their main effort must be made through the 90-mile gap between Verdun and Maubeuge. Through this gap there ran only thirteen through roads. Each road could accommodate three divisions, but not more. So that the limit of numbers which the Germans could employ along this front was about 40 divisions. A similar result was arrived at upon the basis of the extent of front upon which a division could fight, namely from 2 to 2¼ miles. |
Strength of the German main attack. | |
| Against this force the French could probably place from 37 to 39 divisions. So that it was quite likely that our six divisions might prove to be the deciding factor. | Strength of the French active defence. Effect of the intervention of the British Army. | |
| MR. MCKENNA enquired how it was possible for the French and British forces to oppose a greater number of divisions to the Germans in view of the limitations of 3 divisions to a road. | ||
| GENERAL WILSON said that it was owing to the French having their own railways to supply them. Railways would not available to the Germans in the earlier stages. | ||
| MR. CHURCHILL asked whether the Germans might not extend their right further into Belgium. | Extension of the German right to the left bank of the River Meuse. | |
| GENERAL WILSON said that to do this the Germans must either infringe the neutrality of Holland or take Liege. This fortress was strong, but normally its garrison was very weak—700 to 1,000 men—which was quite inadequate to defend it. It was possible, therefore, that the Germans might take it by a coup de main. But they could not hope to capture Huy or Namur or Antwerp in the same way. That portion of their force advancing along the left bank, that is north, of the Meuse would accordingly have to guard its right against the fortress of Antwerp, and if it had entered Belgium through Dutch territory without having captured Liege, it would have to mask that fortress, while in its further advance it would be separated from it main body by the fort of Huy, the fortress of Namur and by the River Meuse. This would be dangerous. Moreover, although the Belgians would possibly be content to protest against the violation of their southern provinces, they would almost certainly fight if the Germans were to invade northern Belgium as well. The Belgian field army would number 80,000 men. On the whole front the broad result was that, although the Germans could deploy 84 divisions against the French 66 and the garrisons of their frontier fortresses, the Germans could not concentrate their superior force against any one point. Our 6 divisions would therefore be a material factor in the decision. Their material value, however, was far less than their moral value, which was perhaps as great as an addition of more than double their number of French troops to the French Army would be. This view was shared by the French General Staff. |
Value of the intervention of the British Army. | |
| SIR EDWARD GREY agreed that our military support would be of great moral value to the French. As to the Belgians, he thought that they would avoid committing themselves as long as possible in order to try and make certain of being on the winning side. | ||
| MR. CHURCHILL enquired what force the Germans could bring up between Lille and Maubeuge by the fifteenth day, if they wished to do so. | German advance through Northern Belgium. | |
| GENERAL WILSON said that six through roads crossed the frontier between Lille and Maubeuge, but it was impossible to say without detailed examination of such a problem, in which so many indeterminate factors existed, what strength the Germans might attain to, and by date they could this line. If the Germans were to extend their front to the north in this manner the French would be able to bring up ten divisions from the south, perhaps more. | ||
| MR. CHURCHILL asked whether the Germans had not sufficient force to attack each gap and to march through Northern Belgium as well. | ||
| GENERAL WILSON said that that was so, but their difficulty was that the march through Northern Belgium was a dangerous operation, and would require so many men to mask the Belgian Army and the Belgian fortresses that if the figures were carefully examined, it would be found that in present circumstances no advantage and a good deal of risk would accure to the Germans by taking this course. In ten years' time they would have so many men that they certainly would be able to press their attack all along the line and march through Northern Belgium as well with additional divisions in reserve at rail head. | Future increase in strength of the German Army. |
Footnotes
- ↑ The National Archives. CAB 38/19/49. pp. i-18.
- ↑ Quoted in Wilson. p. 27.
Bibliography
- Marder, Arthur J. (1961). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: The Road to War, 1904-1914. Volume I. London: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, Keith M. (1985). The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-30195-5.
