Difference between revisions of "114th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence"
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| SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the reply of the Admiralty to the first question was that the Navy could spare no men, no officers, and no ships to assist the Army. The whole force at the disposal of the Admiralty would be absorbed in keeping the enemy within the North Sea. Ordinarily the Navy would furnish transport officers and protecting ships. These could not be furnished in these circumstances. The Channel would, however, be covered by the main operations, and provided the French protected the transports within their own harbours, the Admiralty could give the required guarantee as too the safety of the expedition. | | SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the reply of the Admiralty to the first question was that the Navy could spare no men, no officers, and no ships to assist the Army. The whole force at the disposal of the Admiralty would be absorbed in keeping the enemy within the North Sea. Ordinarily the Navy would furnish transport officers and protecting ships. These could not be furnished in these circumstances. The Channel would, however, be covered by the main operations, and provided the French protected the transports within their own harbours, the Admiralty could give the required guarantee as too the safety of the expedition. | ||
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| − | | <small>Inability of the Navy to assist.<br><br>Safety of the expedition guaranteed. | + | | <small>Inability of the Navy to assist.<br><br>Safety of the expedition guaranteed.</small> |
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| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that as regards that point the General Staff asked for no more. He presumed that the General Staff could count upon the ungrudging support of the Transport Department of the Admiralty. | | SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that as regards that point the General Staff asked for no more. He presumed that the General Staff could count upon the ungrudging support of the Transport Department of the Admiralty. | ||
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| − | | MR. | + | | MR. M<small>C</small>KENNA said that assistance could not be given during the first week of war. The whole efforts of the Admiralty weould be absorbed in mobilising the Navy, and the Transport Department especially would be fully occupied in taking up Fleet Auxiliaries. |
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| − | | <small>Transport Department of the Admiralty unable to assist during the first week of war. | + | | <small>Transport Department of the Admiralty unable to assist during the first week of war.</small> |
|-valign="top" | |-valign="top" | ||
| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that the whole scheme had been worked out in detail. He also pointed out that in the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese Navy had handed over the whole business of sea transport over to the military authorities, who carried out the work without difficulty. | | SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that the whole scheme had been worked out in detail. He also pointed out that in the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese Navy had handed over the whole business of sea transport over to the military authorities, who carried out the work without difficulty. | ||
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| − | | MR. | + | | MR. M<small>C</small>KENNA said that the difficulty lay in the question of time. |
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| − | | MR. | + | | MR. M<small>C</small>KENNA said that he heard of this scheme now for the first time. |
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| − | | <small>The General Staff proposals not previously communicated to the First Lord. | + | | <small>The General Staff proposals not previously communicated to the First Lord.</small> |
|-valign="top" | |-valign="top" | ||
| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that in accordance with the conclusion arrived at by the Sub-Committee, as set out in paragraph 20 (''b'') of their report dated the 24th July, 1909 (C.I.D. Paper 109-B) the General Staff had worked out the details of the scheme with the Departments of the Admiralty concerned. The Director of Naval Intelligence had laid down that to ensure the safety of the transports their courses must be west of a line drawn from Dungeness to Cape Griz Nez. The sea transport of the force had been worked out with the Director of Transports in detail day by day. Such a scheme necessarily implied war. | | SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that in accordance with the conclusion arrived at by the Sub-Committee, as set out in paragraph 20 (''b'') of their report dated the 24th July, 1909 (C.I.D. Paper 109-B) the General Staff had worked out the details of the scheme with the Departments of the Admiralty concerned. The Director of Naval Intelligence had laid down that to ensure the safety of the transports their courses must be west of a line drawn from Dungeness to Cape Griz Nez. The sea transport of the force had been worked out with the Director of Transports in detail day by day. Such a scheme necessarily implied war. | ||
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| − | | <small>The plans worked out in detail by the General Staff with the Naval Intelligence and Naval Transport Departments in accordance with the instructions of the C.I.D. | + | | <small>The plans worked out in detail by the General Staff with the Naval Intelligence and Naval Transport Departments in accordance with the instructions of the C.I.D.</small> |
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| GENERAL WILSON asked if that opinion held good even if every detail had been worked out beforehand. | | GENERAL WILSON asked if that opinion held good even if every detail had been worked out beforehand. | ||
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| + | | ADMIRAL BETHELL said that he had not been able to see Admiral [[Robert Leonard Groome|Groome]], the Director of Transport [sic], but he understood from his Department that they had assumed that the Fleet had already been mobilised. | ||
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| + | | SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the scheme had not been brought to his notice. He had understood that a scheme for dispatching the Expeditionary Force had been mooted, but that it had been abandoned. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | <small>The First Sea Lord unaware of the scheme.</small> | ||
| + | |-valign="top" | ||
| + | | MR. M<small>C</small>KENNA said that there was no question as to the safety of the transports, the sole difficulty was the question of time and the simultaneous demand upon the Transport Department of the Admiralty to meet naval and military requirements. | ||
| + | | | ||
| + | | <small>The question one of time, not of safety.</small> | ||
|} | |} | ||
Revision as of 08:49, 6 August 2022
The 114th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence took place on 23 August, 1911.[1] The meeting was apparently proposed by Haldane at dinner with Asquith, Grey, McKenna and Churchill on 14 August. Excluded from the meeting were Lewis Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies; the Marquess of Crewe, Leader of the House of Lords and Secretary of State for India; and Viscount Morley, Lord President of the Council. The meeting was, according to Harcourt, "arranged some time ago for a date when it was supposed that we should all be out of London!"[2]
Minutes
Present:
The Right Hon. H. H. ASQUITH, M.P., Prime Minister (in the chair).
The Right Hon. D. LLOYD GEORGE, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.
The Right Hon. SIR EDWARD GREY, Bart., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Hon. W. S. CHURCHILL, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department.
The Right Hon. REGINALD MCKENNA, M.P., First Lord of the Admiralty.
Admiral of the Fleet SIR ARTHUR WILSON, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., V.C., First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. E. BETHELL, C.M.G., Director of Naval Intelligence.
The Right Hon. VISCOUNT HALDANE, Secretary of State for War.
Field-Marshal SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON, G.C.B., Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
Brigadier-General H. H. WILSON, C.B., D.S.O., Director of Military Operations.
General SIR JOHN FRENCH, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., Inspector-General of the Forces.
- Rear-Admiral SIR CHARLES OTTLEY, K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O., Secretary.
Major-General SIR A. J. MURRAY, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., Director of Military Training, also attended.
| THE PRIME MINISTER said he had called the Committee together as the European situation was not altogether clear, and it was possible that it might become necessary for the question of giving armed support to the French to be considered. | ||
| The Sub-Committee which examined this question in 1908 came to the following conclusions:— | Report of Sub-Committee on "Military needs of the Empire (C.I.D. Paper 109-B). | |
| "(a) The Committee, in the first place, desire to observe that, in the event of an attack on France by Germany, the expediency of sending a military forceabroad or of relying on naval means alone is a matter of policy which can only be determined when the occasion arises by the Government of the day. | The question of policy. | |
| "(b) In view, however, of the possibility of a decision by the Cabinet to use military force, the Committee have examined the plans of the General Staff, and are of opinion that, in the initial stages of a war between France and Germany, in which the Government decided to assist France, the plan to which preference is given by the General Staff is a valuable one, and the general Staff should accordingly work out all the necessary details. | Instructions to the General Staff. | |
| The General Staff had prepared a fresh Memorandum on the subject in the light of recent developments (C.I.D. Paper 130-B), and on the second hypothesis that the United Kingdom becomes the active ally of France, the important points were those contained on p. 2, namely, that we should mobilise and dispatch the whole of our available regular army of six divisions and a cavalry division immediately upon the outbreak of war, mobilising upon the same day as the French and Germans. It was further suggested that additional reinforcements, consisting of two or three divisions of British and native troops might be drawn from India, and possibly the seventh division from the Mediterranean and South Africa. | Re-examination of the question by the General Staff. Proposals of the General Staff. | |
| Lastly, the General Staff asked from the Admiralty an assurance that the Expeditionary Force could be safely transported across the Channel and from the other directions indicated in their paper, and that the Navy will protect the United Kingdom from organised invasion from the sea. As regards these last two points, Admiralty Memorandum (C.I.D. Paper 131-B) did not give a categorical reply. |
Assurances asked from the Admiralty by the General Staff. | |
| SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the reply of the Admiralty to the first question was that the Navy could spare no men, no officers, and no ships to assist the Army. The whole force at the disposal of the Admiralty would be absorbed in keeping the enemy within the North Sea. Ordinarily the Navy would furnish transport officers and protecting ships. These could not be furnished in these circumstances. The Channel would, however, be covered by the main operations, and provided the French protected the transports within their own harbours, the Admiralty could give the required guarantee as too the safety of the expedition. | Inability of the Navy to assist. Safety of the expedition guaranteed. | |
| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that as regards that point the General Staff asked for no more. He presumed that the General Staff could count upon the ungrudging support of the Transport Department of the Admiralty. | ||
| MR. MCKENNA said that assistance could not be given during the first week of war. The whole efforts of the Admiralty weould be absorbed in mobilising the Navy, and the Transport Department especially would be fully occupied in taking up Fleet Auxiliaries. | Transport Department of the Admiralty unable to assist during the first week of war. | |
| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that the whole scheme had been worked out in detail. He also pointed out that in the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese Navy had handed over the whole business of sea transport over to the military authorities, who carried out the work without difficulty. | ||
| MR. MCKENNA said that the difficulty lay in the question of time. | ||
| ADMIRAL BETHELL said that the demands of the army could not be attended to if they were simultaneous with the mobilisation of the Fleet. | ||
| MR. MCKENNA said that he heard of this scheme now for the first time. | The General Staff proposals not previously communicated to the First Lord. | |
| SIR WILLIAM NICHOLSON said that in accordance with the conclusion arrived at by the Sub-Committee, as set out in paragraph 20 (b) of their report dated the 24th July, 1909 (C.I.D. Paper 109-B) the General Staff had worked out the details of the scheme with the Departments of the Admiralty concerned. The Director of Naval Intelligence had laid down that to ensure the safety of the transports their courses must be west of a line drawn from Dungeness to Cape Griz Nez. The sea transport of the force had been worked out with the Director of Transports in detail day by day. Such a scheme necessarily implied war. | The plans worked out in detail by the General Staff with the Naval Intelligence and Naval Transport Departments in accordance with the instructions of the C.I.D. | |
| GENERAL WILSON asked if that opinion held good even if every detail had been worked out beforehand. | ||
| ADMIRAL BETHELL said that he had not been able to see Admiral Groome, the Director of Transport [sic], but he understood from his Department that they had assumed that the Fleet had already been mobilised. | ||
| SIR ARTHUR WILSON said that the scheme had not been brought to his notice. He had understood that a scheme for dispatching the Expeditionary Force had been mooted, but that it had been abandoned. | The First Sea Lord unaware of the scheme. | |
| MR. MCKENNA said that there was no question as to the safety of the transports, the sole difficulty was the question of time and the simultaneous demand upon the Transport Department of the Admiralty to meet naval and military requirements. | The question one of time, not of safety. |
Footnotes
- ↑ The National Archives. CAB 38/19/49. pp. i-18.
- ↑ Quoted in Wilson. p. 27.
Bibliography
- Marder, Arthur J. (1961). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919: The Road to War, 1904-1914. Volume I. London: Oxford University Press.
- Wilson, Keith M. (1985). The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-30195-5.
