Balfour Papers at the British Library

From The Dreadnought Project
Revision as of 11:12, 21 February 2011 by Simon Harley (Talk | contribs) (Created Page.)

(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to: navigation, search

Add. MSS. 49692

Bonham-Carter memorandum of 20 May, 1915, for the Prime Minister, on 10 Downing Street headed paper.

The Admiralty

In these remarks I assume that A.J.B. is to be appointed First Lord.

The question of the 1st Sea Lord is of essential importance. The best choice would be Jellicoe, but it seems impossible to replace him in his command which position is at least as important as that of 1st. If the possibility of a successor to Jellicoe is considered it will be found that all those who have had experience of high command can be discarded almost off hand viz Prince Louis, May, Bridgeman, Meux, Callaghan. Though the last named undoubtedly had a reputation amongst sailors for posessing the "fleet-eye" & there was considerable outcry from the fleet when he was displaced, yet there seems little doubt, that he is not up to the task.

Of the younger men Beatty has not the administrative capacity & Sturdee is not really a fit appointment.

I pass then to other alternatives for the post of First Sea Lord.

Against Fisher quite apart from the insurmountable obstacle of his recent antics there are very real objections. I think the right opinion amongst his friends at the Admiralty is that he is not up to the work.

He is still full of ideas & of the vitality to carry them through but is not capable of the sustained administrative action which is now needed at the Admiralty more than anywhere else.

Moreover he is a bad enemy & were he to return his first interest For administrative work for the past six months he has literally been 1st S. L. by deputy Crease his private secretary drafting the minutes & [illegible, crossed out] initialling them 'F'.

Moreover he is a bad enemy & were he to return his first interest would be headhunting. He would part company not only with the present Board, which perhaps would be of no very great consequence apart from the creation of further disturbance, but also with Arthur Wilson and with Oliver the Chief of the Staff, who in the present circumstances is the lynchpin of Admiralty administration.

Lastly it would be impossible to give the Dardanelles operation a fair chance was he to remain.

Sir Henry Jackson is undoubtedly a possibility worthy of very serious consideration. He has been in the machine from the beginning of the war, his paper work is admirable & he would have the confidence of the Admiralty & I think of the Fleet.

On the other hand according to his own opinion he is not at present really sufficiently acquainted with the North Sea position as the nature of his work has not admitted of this.

There remains Arthur Wilsopn. He has the confidence of the Fleet & the necessary prestige with the public. His work during the past six months has been absolutely first class & it must be admitted that in his present position of adviser the Navy reaps the full benefit of his experience knowledge & powers. The experience of the war has toned down his fancy & moreover he will be restrained by Oliver his closest friend in the Service with whom he works admirably. The objection to his being placed in a position of actual responsibility is that he is inclined to overwhelm himself with detail & he himself has informed you that in the absence of W.S.C. he does not feel that his health will permit him to undertake the duties of 1st S. L.

There is however a solution to these objections. For years the Admiralty war arrangements includes a provision for the appointment of an additional Sea Lord to relieve the 1st Sea Lord [underlined in blue pencil] of administrative & paper work & so leave him free to devote his energies to the big issues. If Sir Henry Jackson were appointed to such a post the arrangement would it seems certain be received with satisfaction at the Admiralty. Sir A. Wilson would in these circumstances certainly accept the post, but to guard against the possibility of overwork, he should be informed of the reason for Sir H. Jackson's appointment. If after a time he found the work too heavy Sir H. Jackson having then had the opportunity learning the naval position in all its respects could replace him[,] Wilson returning to his present post. Sir A. Wilson has a strong sense of public duty & will I am assured fall in with any arrangement compatible with his health which is thought best in the public interest.

 MBC

 20/5/15[1]

Footnotes

  1. ff. 149-153.