Difference between revisions of "The Smuts Report"

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:4. That the arrangements referred to shall make provision for the automatic passing of the R.N.A.S. and the R.F.C. personnel to the new Air Service, <u>by consent</u>, with the option to those officers and other ranks who are merely seconded or lent of reverting to their former positions.
 
:4. That the arrangements referred to shall make provision for the automatic passing of the R.N.A.S. and the R.F.C. personnel to the new Air Service, <u>by consent</u>, with the option to those officers and other ranks who are merely seconded or lent of reverting to their former positions.
There are legal questions involved in this transfer and the rights of officers and men must he protected, but no dislocation need be anticipated.
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:There are legal questions involved in this transfer and the rights of officers and men must he protected, but no dislocation need be anticipated.
  
 
:5. That the Air Service remain in intimate touch with the Army and Navy by the closest liaison, or by direct representation of both on the Air Staff, and that, if necessary, the arrangements for close co-operation between the three Services be reviewed from time to time.
 
:5. That the Air Service remain in intimate touch with the Army and Navy by the closest liaison, or by direct representation of both on the Air Staff, and that, if necessary, the arrangements for close co-operation between the three Services be reviewed from time to time.
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:6. That the Air Staff shall from time to time attach to the Army and the Navy the Air Units necessary for naval or military operations, and such units shall, during the period of such attachment, be subject, for the purpose of operations, to the control of the respective naval and military commands. Air Units not so attached to the Army and Navy shall operate under the immediate direction of the Air Staff.
 
:6. That the Air Staff shall from time to time attach to the Army and the Navy the Air Units necessary for naval or military operations, and such units shall, during the period of such attachment, be subject, for the purpose of operations, to the control of the respective naval and military commands. Air Units not so attached to the Army and Navy shall operate under the immediate direction of the Air Staff.
  
The Air units attached to the Navy and Army shall be provided with the types of machines which these Services respectively desire.
+
:The Air units attached to the Navy and Army shall be provided with the types of machines which these Services respectively desire.
  
 
:7. That provision be made for the seconding or loan of regular officers of the Navy and Army to the Air Service for definite periods, such officers to be employed, as far as possible, with the naval and military contingents.
 
:7. That provision be made for the seconding or loan of regular officers of the Navy and Army to the Air Service for definite periods, such officers to be employed, as far as possible, with the naval and military contingents.

Revision as of 16:11, 16 August 2017

The Second Report of the Committee on Air Organisation and Home Defence against Air Raids, here named the Smuts Report after its chairman (South African soldier-statesman Jan Smuts), was issued on 17 August, 1917.[1] The product of a committee of the British War Cabinet, its recommendations led to the amalgamation of the Royal Navy’s Royal Naval Air Service with the British Army’s Royal Flying Corps, and the creation of the Royal Air Force in 1918.


The War Cabinet at their 181st meeting held on 11th July 1917, decided (Minute 3):-

“That the Prime Minister and General Smuts, in consultation with representatives of the Admiralty, General Staff and Field Marshal Commanding in Chief Home Forces, with such other experts as they may desire should examine

1. The defence arrangements for Home Defence against air raids.
2. The Air organisation generally and the direction of aerial operations.”

2. Our first report dealt, with the defences of the London area against air-raids. The recommendations in that report were approved by the War Cabinet and are now in process of being carried out. The Army Council have placed at Lord French’s disposal the services of General Ashmore to work out schemes of air defence for this area. We proceed to deal in this report with the second term of reference: the Air organisation generally and the direction of aerial operations. For the considerations which will appear in the course of this report, we consider the early settlement of this matter of vital importance to the successful prosecution of the war. The three most important questions which press for an early answer are:

1. Shall there be instituted a real Air Ministry responsible for all Air Organisation and operations?
2. Shall there be constituted a unified Air Service embracing both the present R.N.A.S. and R.F.C.? And if this second question is answered in the affirmative, the third question arises:-
3. How shall the relations of the new Air Service to the Navy and the Army be determined so that the functions at present discharged for them by the R.N.A.S. and R.F.C respectively shall continue to be efficiently performed by the new Air Service?

3. The Subject of general Air Organisation has in the past formed the subject of acute controversies which are now, in consequence of the march of events, largely obsolete, and to which a brief reference is here made only in so far as they bear on some of the difficulties which we have to consider in this report. During the initial stages of Air development, and while the role to be performed by an Air Service appeared likely to be merely ancillary to naval and military operations, claims were put forward and pressed with no small warmth, for separate Air services in connection with the two old-established War Services. These claims eventuated in the establishment of the R.N.A.S. and R.F.C., organised and operating on separate lines in connection with and under the aegis of the Navy and Army respectively, and provision for their necessary supplies and requirements was made separately by the Admiralty and War Office to provide a safeguard against the competition, friction, and waste which were liable to arise, an Air Committee was instituted to preserve the peace and secure co-operation if possible. When war broke out this body ceased to exist, owing to the fact that its Chairman and members nearly all went to the front, but after a time it was replaced by the Joint War Air Committee. The career of this body was, however, cut short by an absence of all real power and authority and by political controversies which arose in consequence. It was followed by the present Air Board, which has a fairly well defined status and has done admirable work, especially in settling type and patterns of engines and machines and. in co-ordinating and controlling supplies to both the R.N.A.S and R.F.C.

4. The utility of the Air Board is however severely limited by its constitution and powers. It is not really a Board, but merely a Conference. Its membership consists almost entirely of representatives of the War Office, Admiralty and Ministry of Munitions, who consult with each other in respect of the claims of the R.N.A.S. and R.F.C. for their supplies. It has no technical personnel of its own to advise it, and it is dependent on the officers which the departments just mentioned place at its disposal for the performance of its duties. These officers, especially the Director General of Military Aeronautics, are also responsible for the training of the personnel of the R.F.C. service. Its scope is still further limited in that it has nothing to do either with the training of the personnel of the R.N.A.S. or with the supply of lighter-than-air craft, both of which the Admiralty has jealously retained as its special perquisites. Although it has a nominal authority to discuss questions of policy, it has no real power to do so, because it has not the independent technical personnel to advise it in that respect, and any discussion of policy would simply ventilate the views of its military and naval members. Under the present constitution and powers of the Air Board, the real directors of war policy are the Army and Navy, and to the Air Board is really allotted the minor role of fulfilling their requirements according to their ideas of war policy. Essentially the Air Service is as subordinated to military and naval direction and conceptions of policy as the artillery is, and, as long as that state of affairs lasts, it is useless for the Air Board to embark on a policy of its own, which it could neither originate nor execute under present conditions.

5. The time is however rapidly approaching when that subordination of the Air Board and the Air Service could no longer be justified. Essentially the position of an Air Service is quite different from that of the Artillery arm, to pursue our comparison: Artillery could never be used in war except as a weapon in military or naval or air operations. It is a weapon, an instrument ancillary to a Service, but could not be an independent Service itself. Air Service on the contrary can be used as an independent means of war operations. Nobody that witnessed the attack on London on 11th July could have any doubt on that point. Unlike Artillery, an air fleet can conduct extensive operations far from, and independently of, both army and navy. As far as can at present be foreseen, there is absolutely no limit to the scale of its future independent war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war, to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate. The subjection of the Air Board and Service could only be justified on the score of their infancy. But that is a disability which time can remove, and in this respect the march of events has been very rapid during the war. In our opinion there is no reason why the Air Board should any longer continue in its present form as practically no more than a Conference room between the older Services, and there is every reason why it should be raised to the status of an independent Ministry in control of its own War Service.

The urgency for the change will appear from the following facts. Hitherto air-craft production has been insufficient to supply the demands of both Army and Navy, and the chief concern of the Air Board has been to satisfy the necessary, requirements of those Services. But that phase is rapidly passing. The programme of air-craft production which the War Cabinet has sanctioned for the following 12 months is far in excess of Army and Navy requirements. Next Spring and Summer the position will be that the Army and Navy will have all the Air Service required in connection with their operations; and over and above that there will be a great surplus available for independent operations. Who is to look after, and direct the activities of this available surplus? Neither the Army nor the Navy is specially competent to do so; and for that reason the creation of an Air Staff for planning and directing independent Air operations will soon be pressing. More than that: the surplus of engines and machines now being built should have regard to the strategical purpose to which they are going to be put. And in settling in advance the types to be built the operations for which they are intended apart from naval or military use should be clearly kept in view. This means that the Air Board has already reached the stage whore the settlement of future war policy in the Air war has become necessary. Otherwise engines and machines useless for independent strategical operations may be built. The necessity for an Air Ministry and Air Staff has therefore become urgent.

The magnitude and significance of the transformation now in progress are not easily realised. It requires some imagination to realise that next Summer, while our Western front may still be moving forward at a snail’s pace in Belgium and France, the Air battle front will be far behind on the Rhine, and that its continuous and intense pressure against the chief industrial centres of the enemy as well as on his lines of communication may form an important factor in bringing about peace. The enemy is no doubt making vast plans to deal with us in London if we do not succeed in beating him in the air and carrying the war into the heart of his country. The questions of machines, aerdromes, routes and distances, as well as nature and scope of operations require careful thinking out in advance, and in proportion to our foresight and preparations will our success be in these new and far-reaching developments . Or take again the case of a subsidiary theatre: there is no reason why we may not gain such an overpowering Air superiority in Palestine as to cut the enemy’s precarious and limited railway communications, prevent the massing of superior numbers against our advance, and finally to wrest victory and peace from him. But careful Staff work in advance is here in this terra incognita of the Air even more essential than in ordinary militarised naval operations which follow a routine consecrated by the experience of centuries of warfare on the old lines.

The progressive exhaustion of the man-power of the combatant nations will more and more determine the character of this war as one of arms and machinery rather than of men. And the side that commands industrial superiority and exploits its advantages in that regard to the utmost ought in the long run to win. Man-power in its war use will more and more tend to become subsidiary and auxiliary to the full development and use of mechanical power. The submarine has already shown what startling developments are possible in naval warfare. Aircraft is destined to work an even more far-reaching change in land warfare. But to secure the advantages of this new factor for our side, we must not only make unlimited use of the mechanical genius and productive capacity of ourselves and our American Allies. We must create the new directing organisation - the new Ministry and Air Staff which could properly handle this new instrument of offence, and equip it with the best brains at our disposal for the purpose. The task of planning the new Air Service organisation and thinking out and preparing for schemes of aerial operations next summer must tax our Air experts to the utmost and no time should be lost in setting the new Ministry and Staff going. Unless this is done, we shall not only lose the great advantages which the new form of warfare promises, but we shall end in chaos and confusion, as neither the Army nor Navy nor the Air Board in its present form could possibly cope with the vast developments involved in our new Air-craft programme. Hitherto the creation of an Air Ministry and Air Service has been looked upon as an idea to be kept in view but not to be realised during this war. Events have however moved so rapidly, our prospective aircraft production will soon be so great, and the possibilities of aerial warfare have grown so far beyond all previous expectations, that the change will brook no further delay and will have to be carried through as soon as all the necessary arrangements for the purpose can be made.

8. There remains the question of the new Air Service and the absorption of the R.N.A.S. and R.F.C. into it. Should the Navy and the Army retain their own special Air Services in addition to the Air forces which will be controlled by the Air Ministry? This will make the confusion hopeless and render the solution of the Air problem impossible. The maintenance of three Air Services is out of the question, nor indeed does the War Office make any claim to a separate Air Service of its own. But as regards Air work the Navy is exactly in the same position as the Army; the intimacy between aerial scouting or observation and naval operations is not greater than that between long range artillery work on land and aerial observation or spotting. If a separate Air Service is not necessary in the one case, neither is it necessary in the other. And the proper and indeed only possible arrangement is to establish one unified Air Service which will absorb both the existing services under arrangements which will fully safeguard the efficiency and secure the closest intimacy between the Army and the Navy and the portions of the Air Service allotted or seconded to them.

9. To secure efficiency and smooth working of the Air Service in connection with naval and military operations, it is not only necessary that in the construction of aircraft and the training of the Air personnel the closest attention shall be given to the special requirements of the Navy and the Army. It is necessary also that all Air units detailed for naval or military work should be temporarily seconded to those services and come directly under the orders of the naval or army commanders of the forces with which they are associated. The effect of that will be that in actual working practically no change will be made in the Air work as it is conducted to-day, and no friction could arise between the Navy or Army, commands and the Air Service allotted to them.

It is recognised, however, that for some years to come the Air Service will, for its efficiency, be largely dependent on the officers of the Navy and Army who are already employed in this work or who may in the future elect to join it permanently or temporarily. The influence of the regular officers of both services on the spirit, conduct and discipline of the present Air Forces has been most valuable and it is desirable that the Air Board should still be able to draw on the older services for the assistance of trained leaders and administrators. Further, it is equally necessary that a considerable number of officers of both Navy and Army should be attached for a part of their Service to the Air Service, in order that Naval and Military Commanders and Staff Officers may be trained in the new arm and able to utilise to advantage the contingents of the Air Forces which will be put at their disposal. The organisation of the Air Force, therefore, should be such as to allow of the seconding of officers of the Navy and Army for definite periods - not less than four or live years - to the Air Service. Such officers would naturally, after their first training, be chiefly employed with the Naval and Military contingents, in order to secure close co-operation in Air work with their own services. In similar fashion it would be desirable to arrange for the transfer of expert warrant and petty or non-commissioned officers from the Navy and Army to the new Service.

10. To summarise the above discussion we would make the following recommendations:-

1. That an Air Ministry be instituted as soon as possible, consisting of a Minister with a consultative Board on the lines of the Army Council or Admiralty Board, on which the several departmental activities of the Ministry will be represented. This Ministry to control and administer all matters in connection with aerial warfare of all kinds whatsoever, including lighter-than-air as well as heavier-than-air craft.
2. That under the Air Ministry an Air Staff be instituted on the lines of the Imperial General Staff responsible for the working out of war plans, the direction of operations, the collection of intelligence and the training of the Air personnel; that this Staff be equipped with the best brains and practical experience available in our present Air Services, and that by periodic appointment to the Staff of officers with great practical experience from the front, due provision be made for the development of the Staff in response to the rapid advance of this new Service.
3. That the Air Ministry and Staff proceed to work out the arrangements necessary for the amalgamation of the R.N.A.S. and R.F.C. and the legal constitution and discipline of the new Air Service, and to prepare the necessary draft legislation and regulations, which could he passed and brought into operation next autumn and winter.
4. That the arrangements referred to shall make provision for the automatic passing of the R.N.A.S. and the R.F.C. personnel to the new Air Service, by consent, with the option to those officers and other ranks who are merely seconded or lent of reverting to their former positions.
There are legal questions involved in this transfer and the rights of officers and men must he protected, but no dislocation need be anticipated.
5. That the Air Service remain in intimate touch with the Army and Navy by the closest liaison, or by direct representation of both on the Air Staff, and that, if necessary, the arrangements for close co-operation between the three Services be reviewed from time to time.
6. That the Air Staff shall from time to time attach to the Army and the Navy the Air Units necessary for naval or military operations, and such units shall, during the period of such attachment, be subject, for the purpose of operations, to the control of the respective naval and military commands. Air Units not so attached to the Army and Navy shall operate under the immediate direction of the Air Staff.
The Air units attached to the Navy and Army shall be provided with the types of machines which these Services respectively desire.
7. That provision be made for the seconding or loan of regular officers of the Navy and Army to the Air Service for definite periods, such officers to be employed, as far as possible, with the naval and military contingents.
8. That provision be made for the permanent transfer, by desire, of officers and other ranks from the Navy and Army to the Air Service.

In conclusion we would point out how undesirable it would be to give too much publicity to the magnitude of our Air construction programme and the real significance of the changes in organisation now proposed. It is important for the winning of the war that we should not only secure Air predominance, but secure it on a very large scale; and having secured it in this war we should make every effort and sacrifice to maintain it for the future. Air supremacy may in the long run become as important a factor in the defence of the Empire as Sea supremacy. From both these points of view it is necessary that not too much publicity be given to our plans and intentions which will only have the effect of spurring our opponents to corresponding efforts. The necessary measures should be defended on the grounds of their inherent and obvious reasonableness and utility, and the desirability of preventing conflict and securing harmony between naval and military requirements.

Whitehall Gardens, S.W.

17th August 1917.

Footnotes

  1. G.T. 1658. The National Archives. CAB 24/22/58.