The Jutland Controversy
From The Dreadnought Project
Ever since the 1st of June, 1916, which in the opinion of some might have been more glorious than any other First of June in our history, the Navy has been torn with a "Jutland controversy" and the public has been debating a "Jutland mystery."
—Captain R. R. P. E. E. Drax, 1925.[1]
The Jutland Controversy is a general term which can be applied to the debate in British naval, public, and later historical, circles, surrounding the Battle of Jutland in 1916.
Contents
Logs
In Lion's Fair Signal Log (apparently since destroyed)[2] was a disclaimer at 16:55:
- 4.55 p.m.—Most of the records of the outgoing visual signals were lost and destroyed in the action. The records had been sent down to the Port Signal Station to be logged, but, on account of bursting shells and smoke and fire, they got lost or destroyed. This log was preserved with difficulty, not before a hose had been turned on it.[3]
It has been suggested by Andrew Gordon that the Rough Signal Log, far from being lost due by accident or enemy action, was deliberately lost in order to divest the flagship of responsibility for the delayed turn of the Fifth Battle Squadron around 17:00.[4]
Official Despatches
Jellicoe was moved to write to his former Flag Captain, Dreyer, following the death of Sir Julian Corbett:
I wonder also whether his Jutland account will undergo tinkering at Admiralty instigation. Quite possibly I imagine, as it certainly won't please some of those in authority and is so utterly opposite in its deductions from the "Staff" effort.[5]
Record of the Battle of Jutland
In a memorandum of 26 July, 1922 to the D.C.N.S. and First Sea Lord, Haggard wrote:
It was approved verbally that an abridged edition of the 'Naval Staff Appreciation of the Battle of Jutland' should be prepared for issue to the Fleet, on the ground [sic] that many valuable lessons from the action ought to be placed at the disposal of those who it is necessary should profit by them.
The circulation of the 'Appreciation' itself has been suppressed but an edition which confines itself to statement of fact is in preparation for public issue.
The abridgement has proved a matter of considerable difficulty. The mental attitude of the writer was rather that of a counsel for the prosecution than of an impartial appraiser of facts, and obvious bias animates his statements throughout the book, leading to satirical observations and a certain amount of misrepresentation.
Moreover, the writer vigorously condemns the use of the single line in a manner which would be more profitable if a practical method of employment of divisional tactics were indicated.
To criticise on such lines a system, which for all its faults has not yet been superseded, would be out of place in a Staff production intended for the general instruction of officers.
We cannot at this early stage criticise the strategy and tactics employed in so destructive a manner as will be possible ten years hence. The Battle Orders operative at the time of the battle were known to the Admiralty and they remained materially the same until the end of the war. It is doubtful if they would even now be departed from if war were declared in similar circumstances.
It has therefore been necessary to make large alterations in the text at the risk of emasculating the book. I have gone through the 'Appreciation' with Lieut. Commandr. Pollen who having been associated with all the historical work in connection with the battle, is familiar with all its aspects, and have made tentative alterations with a view to adapting it for publication as a Fleet Issue.[6]
Jellicoe gave his opinion of the Staff Appreciation to Dreyer in October:
I have at last nearly finished with that and my comments are nearly as voluminous as the thing itself. It was quite impossible to pass it. When I send it home I shall request that my comments may be published alongside the "Narrative" unless the latter is altered, and shall take steps, in case of refusal, to have them published separately if that is possible. But I can't imagine that the Admiralty can publish in face of my remarks. The errors are so glaring and the deductions so obviously inaccurate as well as being often malicious. I can't conceive how it can have been passed by Chatfield, if indeed it has been.[7]
Narrative of the Battle of Jutland
Roger Keyes in his memoirs opined that the Narrative was an "authentic history":
the accuracy of which cannot be questioned, for it contains a clear official statement of fact without comment or deductions, free from prejudice and bias, compiled after a searching and exhaustive investigation of all British and available German reports by experienced and trustworthy naval officers.[8]
Footnotes
- ↑ Drax. "Jutland or Trafalgar." Naval Review. p. 239.
- ↑ Gordon. Rules. p. 636.
- ↑ Quoted in the Harper Record. p. 24.
- ↑ Gordon. Rules. pp. 139-140.
- ↑ Jellicoe to Dreyer. Letter of 29 October, 1922. Dreyer Papers. Churchill Archives Centre. DRYR 3/1/58.
- ↑ Beatty Papers. National Maritime Museum. BTY/9/5/2. Reproduced in Beatty Papers. II. pp. 454-455.
- ↑ Jellicoe to Dreyer. Letter of 29 October, 1922. Dreyer Papers. Churchill Archives Centre. DRYR 3/1/58.
- ↑ Keyes. Naval Memoirs. II. p. 37.
Bibliography
- Gordon, Andrew (2005). The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command. London: John Murray (Publishers). ISBN 0719561310. (on Amazon.com and Amazon.co.uk).
