The Dreadnought Project

[jwduquette1]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Copyright © 2003 Society for Military History. All rights reserved.
The Journal of Military History 67.1 (2003) 85-136
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A Matter of Timing:
The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912-1916

Jon Tetsuro Sumida
[Tables]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Abstract: In 1912, the Admiralty adopted a secret tactical system that was supposed to enable a British battle fleet to destroy a German opponent through five minutes shooting at medium range. The quick destruction of the Germans was to be followed by a simultaneous turn away by the British, which would counter the threat of enemy torpedoes. Belief in this scheme interfered with the development of equipment and methods suitable to battle fleet action that involved long range and maneuver while shooting, which set the stage for much that went wrong for the Royal Navy at the battle of Jutland.
_________________
SHUFTI CUSH

[jwduquette1]

aaa
_________________
SHUFTI CUSH

[jwduquette1]

zzz
_________________
SHUFTI CUSH

[Adrian Dobb]

Splendid - a Sumida article.

I haven't had time to read it all yet but one thing that did strike me quite quickly was the torpedo ranges and capabilities quoted. The ranges and speeds 'feel' more like the characterstics of WWII era weapons rather than WWI. I checked in Brown and he gives the RN MkII**** settings of 45knots for 4,200 yards or 19 knots for 10,000 yards. He doesn't date the MkII**** but refers to it as the latest version in the context of 1916. To achieve a 10,000 yard range a speed of 19 knots would be 2 knots slower than a 21 knot dreadnought. This sounds to me more like a realistic 1916 capability than the 28/27 knots Sumida mentions, but I'll happily stand corrected? It sounds picky but the slower speed would drasticaly reduce the chances of a hit compared to the higher, even if fired at a long battleline, due to an 11 minute running time.

As I say I haven't read the whole piece yet so I don't even know how important this is to the whole argument, but it just stood out as not feeling quite right.

[tone]

I think this paper is copyrighted. Where did you find it? I may pull this post down if I don't hear from you soon, as one could regard private exchange of such data as being for study purposes, but nailing it on a public website is akin to publication.

I've read this paper before, and regard its thesis as a befuddled fantasy, but doubtless rich in details of some merit. Like many Sumida works, it is a valuable guide to seeing what sources he draws upon which can be fruitful in shaping one's own studies.

tone

[jwduquette1]

hi tone:

as I say, i was googling for something completely unrelated -- secondary fragmentation from plate perforation by armor piercing projectiles. this article came up as a hit. i think i may have accidently back doored the thing.

it is copyrighted as far as i can tell -- it looked interesting.

my only thoughts were that the burden of attack always resided with the germans. i'm not much on the strategy of seapower, but the british did not need to destroy the german fleet to win the war, and RN remaining in being was far more essential than acheiving a trafalger'esk like victory over the high seas fleet.

regards
JD
_________________
SHUFTI CUSH

[tone]

Thanks for removing the text.

Others desiring access to it might find it available for licensed download at reasonable cost. If I had to wager a guess, google would provide such pointers as well. Try searching on

Sumida "A Matter of Timing"

tone